Here's an interesting paragraph from Hendrik Lorenz's review of Plato's Utopia Recast on the Dependency Thesis:
[The Dependency Thesis] is the claim that all goods other than virtue are 'dependent goods', which is to say they are good for people who possess virtue, but bad for the unvirtuous. The dependent goods conspicuously include such things as health, wealth, political influence, and the satisfaction of one's desires. The Thesis is thus an astonishingly counter-intuitive claim. It implies that no unvirtuous person is, or ever can be, benefited by health itself or its restoration, or by the satisfaction of ordinary and in themselves perfectly blameless desires such as hunger, thirst, and sexual arousal.A very small quibble: the last sentence seems to suggest that hunger, thirst, and sexual arousal are always 'perfectly blameless', which does not seem quite right. Can't someone, for instance, be blamed for being hungry, when his hunger results from habitually overeating? (And in general I think the view that 'satisfaction of desire' is good--whatever the desire--is itself a counter-intuitive claim. Not that this is important to settle here, since the Dependency Thesis can be evaluated with respect to other goods only.)
But that things that allow us to act, or to act more effectively, prove harmful to us when we are intent on acting wrongly--that seems intuitive. "It would have been better for him if he had still been struck low with the stomach flu", said of a man who, after recovering, carried out his planned murder today, seems perfectly right.
If this is so, suppose we interpret the Dependency Thesis as: insofar as someone is not virtuous, other things besides virtue are not good for him? (If you wish: take 'not virtuous' to mean 'vicious'. That ambiguity can't affect what's at stake, although it can make the maxim seem more or less plausible.) Why is that 'astonishingly counter-intuitive'?
(Surely this is an issue about which readers of Dissoi Blogoi have views.)