Discussion in this blog has centered on only one aspect of Chris Bobonich's Plato's Utopia Recast, namely, its interpretation of the preludes in Plato's Laws. This selective look was determined by Pradeau's lecture, which claimed that Plato's conception of law was the same in the Laws as in the Republic. We focused on the preludes on the grounds that Plato makes much of this innovation, hence a change, if it were to be found anywhere, would likely be found here.
Readers of this blog who wish, however, to get a sense of the much wider scope of Plato's Utopia Recast may usefully consult an online review by Hendrik Lorenz, forthcoming in Philosophical Review, available here.
Chris Rowe has a review in NDPR here, and gives this thumbnail sketch:
But B’s thesis also has a distinct beauty about it, insofar as it finds the justification for the Laws’ unphilosophical aspect in the very sophistication of the philosophical ideas that underlie it. The basic question B asks is this (for reasons of brevity, I put it rather less circumspectly than does B himself): how is it that Plato can propose that the citizens of Magnesia, most of whom will be non-philosophers, will be happy, when it seems to have been his earlier view – as expressed in Phaedo and Republic – that philosophy is, without exception, the sine qua non of human happiness? Answer: because of changes in his epistemology and psychology, the most important such change being the abandonment of the parts-of-the-soul doctrine advanced in the Republic and (according to B) prefigured in the idea of the opposition between soul and body in the Phaedo, and the substitution for that doctrine of a more unified conception of human agency and motivation.A sign of the wide scope of the book is that neither Lorenz nor Rowe gives attention to the preludes. It's unclear to me how much of the larger argument of the book depends on the interpretation of the preludes that has been disputed here--but I shall look into that.
I don't believe a review has yet appeared in BMCR.