Mystery Passage

Needless to say, no one could pick out a type of bookstore in this way today. 

No googling allowed!

I seemed to be standing in a busy queue by the side of a long, mean street.   Evening was just closing in and it was raining.  I had been wandering for hours in similar mean streets, always in the rain and always in evening twilight.  Time seemed to have paused on that dismal moment when only a few shops have lit up and it is not yet dark enough for their windows to look cheering.  And just as the evening never advanced to night, so my walking had never brought me to the better parts of the town.  However far I went I found only dingy lodging houses, small tobacconists, hoardings from which posters hung in rags, windowless warehouses, goods stations without trains, and bookshops of the sort that sell The Works of Aristotle.  I never met anyone.  But for the little crowd at the bus stop, the whole town seemed to be empty.  I think that was why I attached myself to the queue.

Ancient Philosophy from Brazil, Online

Issue II, Volume II, of the Journal of Ancient Philosophy, published jointly by the University of São Paulo and the University of Campinas, is now available online.  

Contents:

 

Articles:

 

 João Hobuss:  Sobre o Significado da Doutrina da ‘Mediedade’ em Aristóteles

Yara Frateschi:  Virtude e Felicidade em Aristóteles e Hobbes

Susan M. Purviance: Thumos and the Daring Soul: Craving Honor and Justice

 

Barbara Botter: Ressemblance et Participation chez Platon

 

Translations:

 

Marco Zingano:  O Tratado do Impulso e da Faculdade Impulsiva de Alexandre de Afrodísia e sua versão em Miguel de Éfeso 

Reviews:

 

Zingano, Marco: Estudos de Ética Antiga. São Paulo: Discurso Editorial, 2007. ISBN: 978-85-86590-61-0 (Inara Zanuzzi)

I notice that the first issue has an essay by Carlo Natali, which will test my very minimal Portugese: "O Logos peri philias. Notas sobre a natureza e os propósitos dos livros VIII – IX da Ética Nicomaquéia".

Btw, the webpage has one of the clearest images I've seen of the Aristotle bust from the KHM in Vienna:

 

"a wonderful thing happens"

Some day in the study of virtue it might actually be useful to study what those who clearly have a virtue say about it.   Consider for instance these remarks of Col. John Ripley, who died today, an American Marine who led 600 men in battle against 20,000 Vietnamese soldiers: "When you know you're not going to make it, a wonderful thing happens.  You stop being cluttered by the feeling that you're going to save your butt."

Here's a serious warrior reflecting on how something 'wonderful' happens in battle when you cease caring about your own ...  (it's essential to the sentiment that one say) butt.

Gods As We See Them, part II

I asked yesterday about Xenophanes' argument (is there one?), because it seems to me that the fragments are today standardly taken to express an indifference argument, but I don't see that that is the only, or most plausible, alternative.

The indifference argument would be: different kinds of creatures represent the (bodily form) of the gods differently; there is no reason for preferring one such representation than another; thus, no such representation should be affirmed.

Now indifference arguments are common in presocratic philosophy.  Still, this one seems off the mark here, for two reasons.  

First, if that's the sort of argument that Xenophanes had in mind, he would never have presented the argument in a cross-species form-- because it would have struck his audience as absurd to say there was no reason to prefer what humans suppose over what oxen and lions might suppose!  At least, this would be far from a natural claim to make. 

Second, as put forward with regard to different groups of human beings, the argument is too sophisticated: one has to assume that each culture and racial group is on a level with every other, which is an egalitarianism that would have been more problematic for Xenophanes' audience than any theological conclusion he would have wanted to establish.

The truth is, we impute this indifference argument to Xenophanes because we find it easy to accept.  We ourselves presuppose equality of cultures, and we presuppose, too, an innate tendency to 'paint the world with our own thoughts' (a la Hume and Freud), and so, from variations of the sort that Xenophanes describes, we quickly conclude that the differences point to the essentially subjective origin of the phenomena.

The move is well displayed by McKirahan's commentary.  This is the argument as he reconstructs it: 

...we Greeks think the gods have the appearance of Greeks, yet all other peoples portray the gods as having the distinctive characteristics of themselves; but a god cannot simultaneously have the characteristics of all human peoples, and there is no reason to prefer one anthropomorphic account to another.  More radically, [Xenophanes] challenges the very conception of anthropomorphic gods.  In this case too, the belief stems from humans projecting their own nature onto the divine.

I guess I want to say that this reconstruction stems from modern scholars' projecting assumptions that they find plausible onto Xenophanes.

I'll say tomorrow what looks to me an argument that has a better chance of being what Xenophanes actually thought.

Gods As We See Them

I've been thinking about some sayings attributed to Xenophanes in connection with a passage from NE VI.  I'll say what the connection is tomorrow, but for now the sayings, which you know, and some comments:

 Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods all sorts of things that are matters of reproach and censure among men:  theft, adultery, and mutual deception. (B11)

Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black; Thracians that theirs are are blue-eyed and red-haired. (B16)

But if cattle or lions had hands, so as to paint with their hands and produce works of art as men do, they would paint their gods and give them bodies in form like their own-horses like horses, cattle like cattle. (B17)

Comments:

1.  Wikipedia expresses a common view in saying that Xenophanes is ridiculing what he describes.  But what in the Greek (see below) suggests ridicule?   I've heard Jim Lesher in a lecture point out how hard it is to judge whether a remark in an early Greek writer is meant to be a joke.  In fact Lesher remarks,  conservatively, in his SEP article, merely that "Xenophanes comments on the general tendency of human beings to conceive of divine beings in human form".

2.  What is the argument which leads from "oxen and lions would draw the gods as like themselves" to "gods lack bodies" (or to whatever the conclusion is supposed to be)?

3. I don't think it is sufficiently appreciated by commentators how what is ascribed to gods (in these passages) are shapes and appearances conceived of as good (beautiful).  Isn't the thought that Ethiopians find black skin and the snub noses lovely--that's why they represent the gods in that way.   Presumably they are right to take the gods to be beautiful.  And perhaps that's also why it's a mistake to ascribe adultery, theft, and fraud to the gods, as Xenophanes says elsewhere.  (Lesher says that Xenophanes is supposing that "an attribution of scandalous conduct would be incompatible with the goodness or perfection any divine being must be assumed to possess" -- yes, if you are using 'goodness' in the sense of what gives appeal, not for what we might call 'moral' goodness.)

πάντα θεοῖσ' ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ' Ἡσίοδός τε,  

ὅσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν,

κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.

ὡς πλεῖστ' ἐφθέγξαντο θεῶν ἀθεμίστια ἔργα,

κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.

 

ἀλλ' εἰ χεῖρας ἔχον βόες [ἵπποι τ'] ἠὲ λέοντες

ἢ γράψαι χείρεσσι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἅπερ ἄνδρες,

ἵπποι μέν θ' ἵπποισι, βόες δέ τε βουσὶν ὁμοίας

καί <κε> θεῶν ἰδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ' ἐποίουν

τοιαῦθ', οἷόν περ καὐτοὶ δέμας εἶχον <ἕκαστοι>.  

 

Αἰθίοπές τε <θεοὺς σφετέρους> σιμοὺς μέλανάς τε

Θρῆικές τε γλαυκοὺς καὶ πυρρούς <φασι πέλεσθαι>. 

Delays in the Post

What is it they say about vacuums?   Okay, I'll try to break free from my lethargy and post something...

Maybe it's not quite lethargy but simply a lack of conviction that the things that interest me currently would interest others generally.

Nicomachean Ethics VI in Brazil!

I'm in São Paul for the week, for a conference in Nic. Eth. VI at the university, organized by Marco Zingano. Here's the very interesting program that my host has arranged, centered on a new translation and commentary of David Reeve:

Colóquio Ethica Nicomachea - livro VI

Departamento de Filosofia, Universidade de São Paulo

15 a 17 de Outubro de 2008

Programa do Colóquio

Dia 15 de Outubro de 2008, Quarta-Feira

- 14h00 : Gavin Lawrence (University of California) : Aspects of Wisdom: Aristotle and Phronesis

- 15h30 : Hendrik Lorenz (Princeton University) : Aristotle´s Practical Philosophy

- 17h00 : Cristina Viano (CNRS, Paris) : Sur la vertu naturelle

Dia 16 de Outubro de 2008, Quinta-Feira

- 10h00 : C. D. C. Reeve (University of North Carolina) : Nicomachean Ethics VI: translation and commentary (introduction to the text)

- 14h00 : C. D. C. Reeve (University of North Carolina) : Nicomachean Ethics VI: translation and commentary (discussion of the text)

Dia 17 de Outubro de 2008, Sexta-Feira

- 14h00 : Michael Pakaluk (Institute for the Psychological Sciences) : Practical Truth

- 15h30 : Fabio Morales (Universidad Simon Bolivar) :  The Relation between Sophia and Phronesis in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics

- 17h00 : Catherine Darbo (CNRS, Paris) : tba

Organização :  Marco Zingano  mzingano@usp.br   www.fflch.usp.br/df

And here's the view from my room:

As for 'practical truth', maybe I'll say more about that strange bird tomorrow.

De Dή

I forgot something yesterday.    Highlight also a word in the first clause of the sentence:  

Διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης ..., 

since the codices have δέ, δή being Susemihl's correction.   It seems that all the translators quoted by Gotthelf go along with this (since all of them use a roughly postpositive 'then') but should they?

 This is not as insignificant a point as many fine points of translation, since δή serves to underline the chapter break (doesn't it?) --and perhaps here, as sometimes elsewhere, the chapter break should be viewed as irrelevant for the argument.

Also, Gotthelf had asked whether the genitive absolute construction at the beginning was more accurately rendered in English as a dependent or an independent clause: and, if what Aristotle really wrote was δέ, then presumably he was taking that construction itself to be bearing the weight of connecting his new point to what had preceded (cp. 1101b10, perhaps 1108b11, 1111b4, 1162a34, 1176a30.  Is there a rule?   I don't know.)   In English, I think, the same force would be achieved with an independent clause (beginning with 'So' or the equivalent).   

And then, interestingly, it wouldn't be true that, as Gotthelf claims, "a closer mapping onto the Greek syntax is more accurate".   Or, rather, as is so often the case, it turns out that what looks to be a closer mapping really isn't.

 

 

Synecdoche

I wonder if you saw the review of C.C.W. Taylor's Clarendon Aristotle volume on Nic Eth II-IV, by Allan Gotthelf.

I've been reviewing (for many months now) that volume for Classical Review, and what I find so daunting is formulating a judgment on the translation as a whole, since this requires a considerable amount of attention.

I suppose a quick method would be to look at some very challenging sentences of Aristotle, or sentences at which the translator aguably does not do such a good job, and rely upon these in the manner of an experimentum crucis.  But Gotthelf has found an even easier method, which is to judge the entire translation by its first sentence, and by the translator's choice of equivalents for nine words!

You might not believe me, but yes, it's true--Gotthelf's conclusion, based on this evidence alone, is unqualified:

In sum, then, we appear to have a translation that eminently meets the goals of the Clarendon series: it is accurate, readable, and accompanied by a philosophically-oriented commentary -- to which we now turn.

You might say that 'appear' serves to qualify, but in the context, rather, it serves to restrict the evidence for his conclusion to the evidence which Gotthelf has presented.

(But did the editors ask that the examination of other texts be deleted?  After all, Gotthelf promises something more: 

Let's ask if Taylor's translation accomplishes this, and how in that regard it compares, in some sample passages, with the most frequently used recent English translations...

But then he goes on to examine only one sentence.)

By the way, as regards that sentence, Gotthelf looks at ways in which other translations diverge, and then asks whether Taylor is better on these points.    But perhaps a better way of going about it, would be to ask in what ways Aristotle's Greek is possibly suggesting something non-standard,  or subtle, or interesting, and then see whether this gets suitably captured in any of the translations, Taylor's included.    

I'll give you the sentence and highlight what I see as areas which require special attention, and then you can consider whether the translations are completely satisfactory at these places:

Διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς

δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει

καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται

καὶ χρόνου, ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα

ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους.

Δ

Survived to Tell the Tale

Who isn't on Anthony Preus' mailing list?  But if you're not, you might find this interesting, from a missive today:

A conference to honour Alasdair MacIntyre on his 80th birthday will take 
place at University College Dublin, 6-8 March 2009. 

The theme of the conference will be "What happened in and to moral philosophy in the twentieth century?".

Alasdair MacIntyre will deliver an autobiographical paper, "On having survived the moral philosophies of the twentieth century".
Details at http://www.ucd.ie/philosophy/macintyre

(More to come later.)

I Dream a Genius

Not a philosopher or classicist among the MacArthur 'genius' fellowships this year.  

(A point of method.  Shouldn't the very first genius fellowships be awarded to those who have a genius for recognizing genius, and then we can proceed from there?)

But I thought you might be interested in seeing all past recipients from those fields.  

Classics
		Ann Ellis Hanson	Historian
		Leslie V. Kurke	Classicist and Literary Scholar
		Dirk Obbink	Classicist and Papyrologist
		Thomas G. Palaima	Classicist
		Gregory Vlastos	Classicist and Philosopher
	Philosophy
		Stanley Cavell	Philosopher
		Patricia Smith Churchland	Philosopher
		Leszek Kolakowski	Historian of Philosophy and Religion
		Richard Rorty	Philosopher
		Thomas M. Scanlon	Philosopher
		Judith N. Shklar	Political Philosophy

Now, if only genius were received as a gift, as much as the fellowship.

I'm Back

Hi, it's me again. I thought I'd resume blogging on ancient philosophy and see if anyone notices.

Actually, I won't see if anyone notices, since I don't care much about that, and that's not why I blog.

It was refreshing to take a break, and I was contemplating stopping for good. But then in reflecting upon my work habits for the day, I realized that I was consistently wasting half an hour after lunch reading Drudge, or checking e-mail for the nth time, or (even worse) looking at pseudo-necessary purchases on Amazon or eBay. Thus, I figured, why not blog instead? Call that the 'maximin argument' for blogging. It's the least worst waste of one's time. (Say that five times fast.) By the way, that's also the maximin argument for reading this blog.

Also, my wife told me not to stop blogging. (End of argument.) (Hey, but what does that mean .... ?!)

Also, it seemed wrong to blog when there were so many reviews of worthy books waiting to be commented upon, as, for instance, this review of James Warren's introduction to the Presocratics (which apparently no one has commented upon over at the BMCR blog).

Also, I wanted to see how my blog looked on Google Chrome.

And that's all for the day. If Aristotle's right, to do just this much is enough to be half-way to resuming as before.

Every New Word a Neologism

I have been traveling so much recently (Florida, Vienna, now California) that I have not had time to post! But here is a curiosity for today.

Samuel Johnson once said that a book you haven't yet read is for you the same as if it has been recently published. (The Odyssey fresh every generation.) Can we say similarly that a word that you didn't know is as if it had recently been coined?

I encountered a word today which I know I had never seen before, and yet which for all I know may not be uncommon. It's not surprising that there should be words like that, but I don't know if this is such a word. So I ask you, have you seen this word before in English?

The word is: hypothecate.

It's used in two senses in English (see the OED entry below). Its more common sense is 'to support a loan with a pledge of property', e.g. you borrow money, and you pledge collateral for the loan; the creditor has the right to take possession of the property and liquidate it if you default on the loan, but you remain the owner of the property in the meantime. The loan is secured not by you, but by the property: that is, if the liquidation of the property ends up not being sufficient to repay the principal of the loan, you are off the hook for the rest (A pawnshop works in that way: the pawnbroker lends money for a fraction of the value of the pawned property and cannot take possession of it until some period for repayment has elapsed.)

In the less common sense, to hypothecate is to hypothesize (see Ezra Pound's pedantry, below).

Wikipedia says that maybe the noun, 'hypothecation', is used now in a third sense, as an abbreviation of 'hypothetical dedication' (yikes!), as in the earmarking of tax receipts for some particular purpose, to wit: "The new gasoline tax is a hypothecation for the funding of public transportation."

So, be honest with me: Did you know this as an English word already? (Yes, I am aware that anyone who knows the word will think it obvious that everyone does, and so a confession of ignorance is hazardous. But by the same token a confession of ignorance may be refreshing.)

(I suspect it's not common in English, even as a legal term of art, because the US 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in 1993 decided a case which hinged on the meaning of the word as used in a corporate charter.)

1. trans. To give or pledge as security; to pledge, pawn, mortgage.

1681 STAIR Instit. IV. xxv. §5 (1693) 619 The Fruits of the Ground..which by the Law were Hypothecat for the Rents of the said year. 1754 ERSKINE Princ. Sc. Law (1809) 197 The whole cattle on the ground..are hypothecated for a year's rent, one after another successively. 1755 N. MAGENS Insurances II. 55 We oblige ourselves and hypothecate, for the Security and Payment of the Sum of this Writing, the said Ship..and we oblige ourselves not to dispose thereof in any manner, until the said Sum be entirely paid. And whatever is done to the contrary, let it be null, as a Thing done against an express Prohibition and Hypothecation. 1756 ROLT Dict. Trade, Hypotheca, among the moderns to hypothecate a ship, is to pawn or pledge the same for necessaries; and into whose hands soever the ship comes, it is liable. 1797 BURKE Regic. Peace III. Wks. VIII. 319 Whether they to whom this new pledge is hypothecated, have redeemed their own. 1827 SCOTT Napoleon (1834) I. vi. 206 The assembly adopted a system of paper money, called assignats, which were secured or hypothecated upon the church lands. 1855 MACAULAY Hist. Eng. xii. III. 148 He had no power to hypothecate any part of the public revenue.

2. trans. = HYPOTHESIZE v. 2.

1906 Nature 7 June 136/1 Mr. Cowell hypothecated a resisting medium through which the earth travels. 1912 R. FRY in Gt. State ix. 271 Mr. Wells's Modern Utopia..hypothecates a vast superstructure of private trading. 1915 E. B. HOLT Freudian Wish i. 4 One will best..not hypothecate to this end any such thing as ‘psychic energy’. 1920 E. POUND Let. 12 Sept. (1971) 161 You are talking through your hat when you suggest that I..was ever ass enough to have picked ‘La Figlia’ for the fantastic occasion you hypothecate. 1952 Pediatrics IX. 724 One had to hypothecate the existence of a mutation of organisms.

Hence hypothecated ppl. a.; also hypothecator, one who hypothecates or pledges something as security.

1779 SIR W. JONES Comm. Isæus Wks. 1799 IV. 205 The property..was distinguished like all other hypothecated estates, by small columns, and inscriptions..containing a specification of the sum for which they were pledged. 1828 WEBSTER cites Judge Johnson for Hypothecator. 1865 Day of Rest Oct. 574 The iron box in the back sitting room, containing the hypothecated jewels, had been rifled.

Scholarship in Logical Empiricism

It's always interesting to see how scholarship in ancient philosophy looks from the outside. Consider this paragraph from the review today in NDPR of the Cambridge Companion to (of all things) Logical Empiricism:

Another feature of much recent work on logical empiricism on display in this Companion is that comparatively less attention is paid to detailed argument reconstruction and assessment, and comparatively more to uncovering the causes -- both 'internal' and 'external'/socio-historical -- of the logical empiricists' beliefs. This follows the wider trend in history of philosophy more generally, but logical empiricist scholarship, unlike other subfields such as ancient and early modern philosophy, lacks the argument reconstructions and evaluations of earlier generations of scholars. Of course, there are very able philosophers, like Scott Soames, who have engaged in detailed argument reconstruction and assessment of logical empiricists' views (Soames 2003). However, readers hoping for work like Soames' in this Companion will likely be disappointed.

There are all kinds of interesting questions here.

Is it really the case that scholars in ancient philosophy, as the reviewer suggests, now have greater license in speculating about 'internal' and 'external' causes of philosophical views, because a previous generation of scholars spent lots of time giving logical paraphrases of arguments in classical texts? Does anyone now see things in that way, or isn't it rather that efforts of the earlier generation are viewed as flawed because limited and distorting?--whereas the minority of scholars who do regard the earlier analyses as valuable continue still to read texts in that way.

Also, I wonder about the comparison of 'logical empiricism scholarship' with 'ancient philosophy scholarship', in this sense. That is, I wonder if, quite counterintuitively, scholars in ancient philosophy as a whole have the same interests in mere history as does 'logical empiricism scholarship'. I once heard Warren Goldfarb say that he studied Wittgenstein's Tractatus because he wished it were true (although he knew it wasn't); but I don't think that generally 'logical empiricism scholars' think that, say, Carnap's Aufbau just might be true. Yet I wouldn't be surprised to find that a common motive among scholars of Plato, Aristotle, or (say) the Stoics, is that they indeed suspect (and not merely wish) that what they are studying is true--and they engage in the historical scholarship with a view to the truth. So ironically it might be the case that scholarship in ancient philosophy ends up being, in intention, less a matter of history than scholarship in logical empiricism.

Also consider this. That logical empiricism is being studied historically, by 'scholars of logical empiricism', shows that it is now part of the history of philosophy. But if Quine (say) is part of 'history', then which philosopher --even those alive today--isn't a part of 'history', and why isn't 'history' completely on a par with what is written by philosophers active today? That is, 'scholarship in logical empiricism' tends to break down the supposed difference between philosophy and history of philosophy.

Also consider: if logical empiricism is a matter of 'history', then it is one philosophical movement among others in 'history', in which case, surely, it needs to be argued for that it deserves special prominence of influence over any other school or movement in the history of philosophy, and yet, demonstrably, the landscape of philosophy in the U.S. is a direct result of logical empiricism. (The landscape is not that which one would see if, for instance, the most dominant members of a previous generation were unreconstructed Kantians or Thomists.) So isn't the profession, then, captive to arbitrary accidents of power and influence?

My Favorite Blog for Links

My favorite blog for links?

Without question Terry Teachout's About Last Night, where scrolling far down in the right-hand column one may find links to the only existing movie of Willa Cather; movies of Leonard Bernstein conducting the overture to Candide, a young Van Cliburn playing a Liszt Hungarian rhapsody, or even (believe it or not) Mark Twain (a film made by Thomas Edison); and sound recordings of G.K. Chesterton, P.G. Wodehouse, Dylan Thomas, W.B. Yeats, Ezra Pound and T.S. Eliot ("Prufrock" and "Waste Land")--among many others.

Be forewarned: don't start looking at his collection unless you have an hour free!

And Teachout besides is the best writer reviewing the arts today.

WASAP the Finale: Pierre Destrée at Johns Hopkins, 4pm Friday

The last talk of the DC Area Symposium in Ancient Philosophy is to be given by Pierre Destrée at Johns Hopkins on
Friday May 2 at 4pm. The title is "Catharsis in Aristotle's Poetics".

Here is a link to a page of the Johns Hopkins web site that gives directions, information about parking, and link to a campus map.