The key paragraph of Fran O'Rouke's "Aristotle and the Metaphysics of Evolution" is this:
Although Aristotle never espoused it, I suggest that with certain modifications his metaphysics is compatible with evolution, understood as the development of virtualities latent within specific form. This would entail extending the meaning of potency beyond individual members of the species, viewed in isolation, to the prospective potency of the entire species, that is, beyond the phenotype to the genotype and genepool itself. Such evolution would be governed for Aristotle by a teleonomy rooted in the bond between formal and final causes, and influenced by the external circumstances of generation (45).But on this picture, wouldn't an earlier species become, then, the (logical) genus, in relation to which a later species, evolved from it, would be a (logical) species--because that later species would be just one among various definite ways in which the earlier kind might have evolved, and therefore one among various possible specifications of it? --Not that that's a bad result, since the science of cladistics, I believe, classifies living things in roughly that way.
Yet even if this suggestion were sound, it would render Aristotelian metaphysics compatible only with the fact of evolution, not the mechanism of natural selection. Natural selection is the more difficult case, because it is non-teleological. O'Rourke quotes Stephen Jay Gould who explains that, according to Darwin, chance selection takes place after "variation occurs with no preferred orientation in adaptive directions" (33). I don't see that O'Rourke ever answers this point. After quoting Gould, Ernst Mayr, and others, he simply says:
From the Aristotelian perspective it must be stressed, however, that even if the development of an organ comes about through random mutation, with the nonsurvival of countless unsuccessful stages, whichever one becomes established must be in some sense preordered in the nature of things (34).But in what sense are developments 'preordered in the nature of things'? Isn't 'preordering' excluded by the mechanism of natural selection? We can't insist that that's how things 'must be' on an Aristotelian perspective, when the soundness of that perspective is what is at issue.