Here's a way to sharpen my complaint with how this passage from NE III.7 typically gets handled. Rowe/Broadie say:
"The aim of this passage is clear, although the detail is obscure. ... Aristotle is emphasizing that an action is correctly said to be done from courage only if it is, and is done as, an instance of the fine, rather than, say, because it is useful, or because one will be punished otherwise. This will be the main criterion that distinguishes actions of real courage from ones belonging to the five false types (see below). In four of these the fine is absent, and in one (the first) it is present imperfectly."All that this commentary says (in three different ways), is that Aristotle wishes to include some reference to the kalon in his definition of courage.
He had already done so! -- Yes, look again at 1115b11-13, a few lines earlier:
φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς.Thus the point has already been made, and--one would think--sufficiently emphasized. So, then, what is this later passage meant to do? Why does Aristotle revisit the point? Presumably he is now giving an argument for including the kalon in the definition of courage (recall its conclusion: καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν). The interpreter's task, I should think, is to explain why Aristotle thought he needed to argue for this, and what that argument is -- which the Rowe/Broadie commentary, for all its ample merits and astuteness elsewhere, does not provide.
"So he will be afraid of those things too, but he will withstand them in the way one should, and following the correct prescription, for the sake of achieving what is fine; for this is what excellence aims at." (Rowe/Broadie).