Senn's first argument for his thesis is a fallacy; but the second needs to be taken more seriously.
Here's the first:
There are certainly a number of passages in the Apology in which the good condition of soul is characterized as the greatest good. Consider Socrates' habitual exhortation to everyone 'to attend to neither bodies nor money before--or as vehemently as--[you attend to] the soul in order that it will be best' (30A-B; cf. 29D9-E2, 36C, 39D). He also uses the word 'virtue' to describe that which he exhorts everyone to attend to (31B, 41E; cf. 29E5, 30B3). Socrates' final exhortation in the Apology (41E) makes it clear that he thinks there is nothing that one must attend to before attending to virtue.But of course this is a fallacy, because from 'virtue is a greater good than external goods and the good of the body' it does not follow that 'no good is greater than virtue.' (And that conclusion even more clearly does not follow from 'attend to no good before virtue'!)
Senn seems not to recognize the fallacy. His next sentence is: "None of this, however, proves that for Socrates virtue is the sole ultimate end", which might suggest that Senn does see the fallacy. But, if he had seen the fallacy, why would he have written, "There are certainly a number of passages in the Apology in which the good condition of soul is characterized as the greatest good"? Also, the fallacy consists in concluding that virtue is an ultimate end, not that it is the sole ultimate end. (Is this a place where Senn gets into trouble from conflating ultimate and intrinsic?)
In any case, Senn puts this argument aside and turns instead to his second argument, viz. that Socrates' remarks about his immunity from harm make sense only on the supposition that he regards virtue as 'the sole intrinsic good'.
But the fallacy is worth noting en passant because it is probably not uncommon.
2 comments:
"…Why would [Senn] have written, 'There are certainly a number of passages in the Apology in which the good condition of soul is characterized as the greatest good'?"
One guess: Though his sons, at the time of his speech to the Athenians, are quite young (one a "lad", the others younger, and one no more than a babe in arms – Phaedo 60a), Socrates has already determined that, when they become adults, they will have to be admonished if they care for anything before virtue (41e):
"…when my sons grow up, avenge yourselves by causing them the same kind of grief that I caused you, if you think they care for money or anything else more than they care for virtue…" (trans. Grube)
There is not supposed to be something peculiar about Socrates' sons; as Socrates points out, the same is true of all the Athenians that Socrates has been similarly admonishing his whole life. At Ap. 41e, then, Socrates is clearly suggesting a view according to which one – anyone! – ought to be given "grief" if they care for anything before virtue. The view suggested is that if one is human, then necessarily one ought to care for virtue before anything else (and not just before "external goods and the good of the body"). Certainly one perfectly appropriate way of describing such a view is to say that, according to it, virtue is, in one sense at least, the "greatest" good there is (at least for human beings) – i.e., in the sense that nothing (at least right now) ought to be taken more seriously than it. (Of course, even according to such a view, virtue might properly be said not to be the "greatest" good in some other sense: e.g., if there is some other good for the sake of which virtue ought (now) to be taken most seriously of all things. The words "greatest" and "good" in English – and, I would think, the corresponding Greek words – are notoriously polyguous.)
Now given the fact that, as Michael notes, Senn concludes, "None of this, however, proves that for Socrates virtue is the sole ultimate end", it stands to reason that Senn did indeed recognize that although Socrates does characterize virtue as (in one sense) the greatest good, this doesn’t imply that Socrates regards it as the sole ultimate end. From at least those passages Michael quotes, it's not clear to me that Senn himself was taken in or tempted by the "fallacy" Michael describes. In fact, he seems to warn us against it, which is maybe why he "puts it aside" and turns to a different argument.
Please forgive yet another comment (so soon and without even any response to my initial comment on this thread), but I have just reexamined 3 passages that seem, almost by themselves, to vindicate Senn's contention that "There are certainly a number of passages in the Apology in which the good condition of soul is characterized as the greatest good." Senn of course refers to them in the passage Michael quotes; but it helps actually to look at what they say. See if you don't agree:
"…If one of you disputes this and says he does care [for wisdom, truth, and the best possible state of his soul], I shall not let him go at once or leave him, but I shall question him, examine him and test him, and if I do not think he has attained the goodness [aretē] that he says he has, I shall reproach him because he attaches little importance to the most important things and greater importance to inferior things." (Ap. 29e-30a)
"…I went to each of you privately and conferred upon him what I say is the greatest benefit, by trying to persuade him not to care for any of his belongings before caring that he himself should be as good and as wise as possible…"(36c)
"…It is best and easiest not to discredit others but to prepare oneself to be as good as possible" (39d; all trans from Grube).
It is true that at 29e (as well as at 36c) Socrates appears to be urging his listeners to care for other things besides simply the soul's being as good as possible (elsewhere (e.g., 30b, 31b, 41e) called simply "virtue"): he seems to urge them to care for truth and wisdom as well. (So, accordingly, at 30a we have the plural "most important things".) But we should note that at 30a7-b2, 31b5, 39d6-8, and 41e2-5 Socrates mentions only virtue or (what is the same thing) the soul's being as good as possible and fails to mention truth and wisdom; and in all these passages Socrates is trying convince his listeners of what is most important. Now, as there cannot be more than one most important thing, these textual facts strongly indicate that the use of "kai" (usually translated into the English "and") at 36c7 and in the last half of 29e1 is epexegetic: we are to understand those "other" things to be in fact one and the same with virtue or the soul's being as good as possible.
Isn't this at least prima facie reason for taken Socrates as regarding virtue as the greatest of all goods (whether or not he also regards it as the sole intrinsic good)?
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