The following communication from Eric Brown deserves a post of its own (posted with permission):
I was interested in your exchange with Jennifer Whiting about philanthropia in the Nicomachean Ethics, as I am finishing up an article that contrasts the Stoic ideal of cosmopolitan friendship with Aristotle's notion of philanthropia. I think that I agree with you, against Whiting, that philanthropia is not a matter of overcoming natural tendencies—does that accurately express her view?—although I agree with Whiting, against you, that in EN VIII 1 1155a16-22, Aristotle contrasts friendship arising tois homoethnesi with friendship arising tois anthropois.
I take your point, Michael, that the scope of ethnos (and so homoethnesi) can vary. But I disagree with you about the import of our passage. First, I divide it a bit differently from you:
fu&sei t' e0nupa&rxein e1oike [(a)] pro_j to_ gegennhme/non tw|~ gennh&santi kai pro_j to_ gennh~san tw|~ gennhqe/nti, ou) mo&non e0n a)nqrw&poij a)lla_ kai\ e0n o1rnisi kai\ toi=j plei/stoij tw~n zw|&wn, kai\ [(b)] toi=j o(moeqne/si pro_j a1llhla, kai\ ma&lista [(c)] toi=j a)nqrw&poij, o3qen tou_j filanqrw&pouj e0painou~men.
With the rendering by Ross, as revised by Urmson, I take Aristotle to distinguish three kinds of natural friendship: parent-offspring (in both directions), intra-stock, and human-human. Others, including Gauthier and Jolif, Irwin, Pakaluk, and Rowe, take Aristotle to distinguish just two kinds of natural friendship: parent-offspring and intra-stock friendship, the latter of which is understood as intra-species friendship and is exemplified by human-human friendship.
Gauthier and Jolif do not discuss the point in their commentary, nor does Broadie in the commentary that accompanies Rowe's translation. Fortunately, Irwin and Pakaluk give reasons. Having rendered toi=j o(moeqne/si as "members of the same species," Irwin notes (273) that "members of the same race" would be more literally apt, but he insists that "the rest of the paragraph shows that Aristotle has species in mind (i.e., friendship among dogs or human beings, rather than friendship among greyhounds or Greeks)." But this begs the question: it supposes that the rest of the paragraph pertains to the natural friendship of members of the same ethnos, which is exactly what is denied by those who, like me, take the rest of the paragraph to discuss the natural friendship of human beings with each other as something distinct from intra-ethnos friendship. Pakaluk argues that 'friendship seems to be present by nature' should not be understood before 'especially in human beings' because "Aristotle had already added 'not only among human beings' in relation to the idea that friendship arises by nature" (48). But Aristotle had already added 'not only among human beings' to the idea that parent-child and child-parent friendships arise by nature, and this says nothing about whether general human-human friendship arises by nature. So I see no good reason to recognize just two kinds of friendship here.
For the alternative reading I adopt, I offer the following reason. In 1155a16-19 Aristotle uses bare datives to pick out the possessors of a natural friendship (parents and children, members of the same stock) and datives preceded by e0n to pick out the kinds of beings among which the parent-child friendship is found (human beings, birds, and most other kinds of animals). So if he meant to say that intra-stock (understood as intra-species) friendship is found especially among human beings, he ought to have employed e0n before the dative toi=j a)nqrw&poij. By using the bare dative toi=j a)nqrw&poij, he puts "human beings" parallel to members of the same stock (and parents and children); in other words, he says that friendship naturally arises for humans with each other just as it arises for parents and children, on the one hand, and members of the same stock, on the other.
So, unlike Pakaluk, I think that this passage contrasts friendship that arises tois homoethnesi with friendship that arises tois anthropois, and, unlike Whiting (?), I think that it asserts that friendship tois anthropois arises naturally.
I thank Brown for his thoughtful and interesting comments. In the spirit of Dissoi Blogoi, I would reply as follows.
Brown takes (c) above to be marking out a third kind of natural friendship; in contrast I take (c) to be indicating a class subsumed under (b):
1) Brown's argument about the absence of e0n before toi=j a)nqrw&poij is not decisive, as we could just as well interpret toi=j a)nqrw&poij as parallel to toi=j o(moeqne/si, as giving a special case of it.
Futhermore, there are two reasons for taking it in just that way:
2) The qualification of (c) with ma&lista naturally suggests that (c) is presenting a more intense instance of something that is the same in kind as (b); and,
3) Clause (c) lacks a pro/j clause, to indicate the relata of the friendshp (cp. pro_j to_ gegennhme/non, pro_j to_ gennh~san ); and surely pro_j a1llhla is meant to be carried over from (b), as would be natural if (c) were a special case of (b).
That is to say, both the presence of ma&lista and the absence of pro_j a1llhla connect (c) with (b) in the manner of a special instance to a more general class.
And perhaps a more general comment is in order also. The first part of VIII.1 serves not simply as a presentation of endoxa but also as something like a Table of Contents for VIII and IX (as I once heard David Konstan observe). One can map most of its sentences to later discussions. But is there a discussion of a distinct kind of 'natural friendship among members of the human race' later on, comparable to Aristotle's treatment of the other sorts of friendship by nature? But perhaps you answer this in your paper.