Facts of Omission

How do we decide whether an interpretation:

• nicely makes explicit some important theme that is implicit in the text, or
• imposes a meaning on the text that the text really does not bear?

In particular, is there some important view about moral beauty that is implicit in Aristotle's Ethics? I have been sympathetic to this claim myself, since one would at first suppose that Aristotle resembles Plato in this respect and works in the same framework. And yet recently I have been troubled by whether there is any evidence in the text that ultimately requires that sort of interpretation.

I posed the challenge: Are there any passages in NE where kalon is used, where that term cannot be understood as standing proxy for 'good' (or as 'admirable' or perhaps 'fitting', in an ordinary sense)--as spoudaios stands proxy of agathos?

And I've been unconvinced by Gabriel Lear's essay, which aims to work out a theory of moral beauty in the NE, because she frequently blends together interpretation and evidence.

An example is a paragraph Lear quotes from Aristotle on p. 132. Here is the quotation she gives, as it is found in her essay:

The happy person always, or more than anyone else, does and reflects on [theoresei] actions in accordance with virtue and bears his luck in the finest way possible [kallista] and in a way that is harmonious in absolutely every respect . . . Many great pieces of fortune will make his life more blessed (for these naturally help adorn it, and the use of them is fine [kale] and decent). But if they happen the opposite way, they crush and maim blessedness, since they bring pains and impede many activities. But nevertheless even in these circumstances the fine [to kalon] shines through [dialampei] . . . We think the truly good and sensible person bears all chances gracefully [euschemonos] and always makes the finest things possible [ta kallista] from his circumstances, just as . . . a cobbler makes the finest [kalliston] shoe from the skins he is given. (I.10.110b19-1101a5).

On Lear's gloss, this passage highlights moral beauty: "The virtuous person is musical; he is able to act with good order and grace no matter the circumstances. ... Aristotle suggests that what mitigates the misfortune of his position is not simply that his actions are as well ordered as they could possibly be given the situation, but that the beauty of these actions 'shines through'. To whom must this beauty be visible if it is to be of relevance in assessing the extent of his unhappiness? ... because he is a reliable craftsman of the fitting (IV.2.1122a34-5), something of beauty will always shine through and, given the sort of person he is, he will gaze on it."

Yet the paragraph seems to bear that meaning, only because words have been omitted, as becomes clear if we supply them (highlighted):

The happy person always, or more than anyone else, does and reflects on [theoresei] actions in accordance with virtue and bears his luck in the finest way possible [kallista] and in a way that is harmonious in absolutely every respect as someone who is 'truly good [alethos agathos] and four-square beyond reproach'. Many great pieces of fortune will make his life more blessed (for these naturally help adorn it, and the use of them is fine [kale] and decent). But if they happen the opposite way, they crush and maim blessedness, since they bring pains and impede many activities. But nevertheless even in these circumstances the fine [to kalon] shines through [dialampei] when anyone calmly endures frequent great misfortunes, not because he is hardened to them, but because he is a man of nobility and great-heartedness [megalopsychos]. We think the truly good and sensible person bears all chances gracefully [euschemonos] and always makes the finest things possible [ta kallista] from his circumstances, just as both a good general uses the army at his disposal for the very best effect in war [polemikotata] and a cobbler makes the finest [kalliston] shoe from the skins he is given.

Each of the three passages omitted, it seems, takes away what might have seemed to be special in Aristotle's use of kalon or similar words. The first traces the happy person's ability to endure bad fortune simply to his goodness of character. The second explains what Aristotle means by 'shines through': namely, that bad fortune provides an opportunity for a person to show especially that side of his character by which he disdains goods of fortune. (And the relevant virtue is megalopsychia, not megaloprepeia, as Lear's citing of IV.2 would suggest.)

The third omitted text, with its appeal to a general's use of his troops, indicates that beauty is quite inessential to the point that Aristotle wishes to make (which involves a double illustration, kai ... kai...), and, indeed, it suggests that kalliston, even in reference to the cobbler, means something like 'most serviceable' or 'very well-made'.

So still I'm still left wondering: Is moral beauty an idea that is important and presupposed in NE, or dispensable and imposed? Does the editing of the passage above reveal a pattern that might have been missed, or create the impression of a pattern that is not there?