I wish to consider Crivelli's arguments in Aristotle on Truth that Aristotle believes in the existence of 'states of affairs'. According to Crivelli, these are non-mental, non-linguistic objects of a propositional nature which explain the truth and falsehood of beliefs and sentences (4, 46). The evidence for Aristotle's accepting 'states of affairs' is found, Crivelli holds, in Metaphysics Delta 29 and Theta 10.
Here is Crivelli's argument as based on Delta 29:
Metaphysics Delta 29 discusses the uses of 'false'. The following excerpt from this chapter is the most unequivocal testimony of Aristotle's commitment to states of affairs as bearers of truth or falsehood:By the way, the term rendered 'object' is pragma.
T 1 One way in which what is false is spoken of is by being a false object. This can happen, on the one hand, because it is not combined or it is impossible for it to be composed (the diagonal's being commensurable and your being seated are spoken of in this way, for one of these is false always and the other sometimes, for it is in this sense [sc. in the sense of being false] that these are non-beings), and, on the other hand, in the case of such items that [...] (1024b17-21)
Objects are then called 'false' in this way, either because they themselves are not or [...] (1024b24-5)
In T 1 Aristotle offers two, and only two, examples to clarify what kind the items are which he there describes by using 'object' and 'false'. He names the items which he introduces in these examples by means of the phrases 'the diagonal's being commensurable' (1024b19-20) and 'your being seated' (1024b20). What could the items be which Aristotle in T 1 describes by using 'object' and 'false', and names by using 'the diagonal's being commensurable' and 'your being seated', if not the state of affairs of the diagonal's being commensurable, and the state of affairs of your being seated? Therefore, the items which Aristotle in T 1 describes by using 'object' and 'false' are probably states of affairs. Accordingly, T 1's main point is probably to explain what it is for a state of affairs to be false (46-7)
It's a curious passage, and Crivelli's argument is curious. From the discussion that follows (47-9), it is clear that Crivelli is giving an argument from cases, which I'll summarize as follows:
1. Aristotle refers here to things that are both existents (pragmata) and false.Presumably, to reply to Crivelli, one would need to find some other kind of thing that Aristotle could be talking about (i.e. challenge premise 2), or dispute the claim that these pragmata are existing things (challenge premise 1).
2. There seem to be only three possibilities: these things are (i) Russellian facts; (ii) composite objects; or (iii) states of affairs.
3. But Russellian facts are always true, yet what Aristotle is referring to can be false.
4. And if something like 'the diagonal's being commensurable' were meant to be a composite object, it would be a non-existent object (because the diagonal is not commensurable), and yet what Aristotle is referring to exists (they are pragmata).
5. Thus, what Aristotle is referring to are states of affairs.