It's Official-- A Break

I just realized I've been taking de facto a break, so might as well make it de jure.

I'll return on Tuesday, April 1st (just fooling, of course).

Clean Up Operation -- Feel Free to Skip This Post

I'll tell you how I like to deal with the problem I presented in my last post, and then I'll move on.

It's a real problem-- since surely the etymology of the word akolasia never was marked out in a diagram anywhere earlier.

This is a fairly fine-grained point, and I don't imagine that many of you have an interest in this that would compel you to work through the details. I'm presenting these remarks today simply for the sake of completeness.

Here's my way of marking out what is going on (see below). The lines highlighted in green represent those that I think belong to the original and primary discussion of the passage; the lines highlighted in yellow represent what I think is an interpolation and digression. That they are an interpolation is, I think, clear from the fact that περὶ ἡδονάς τινας καὶ λύπας εἰσί (b10) refers back to σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀκολασίας in the first line of the passage.

In my view, the content of the phrase, τὴν ἀκολασίαν ὀνομάζοντες μεταφέρομεν, belongs at the point of the red caret mark, because the metaphorical usage of the term akolasia is actually explained by the phrase ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες· κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται τὴν ἀκολασίαν, viz. the term akolasia is originally used of children, because they are the ones for who it is most obviously true that they are 'undiscplined' in the sense of "undisciplined, when they might have been 'cured' had they been disciplined"--and it's in accordance with akolasia used in this sense, that the vice is named (κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται τὴν ἀκολασίαν).

I don't see quite (yet) the exact form that the words τὴν ἀκολασίαν ὀνομάζοντες μεταφέρομεν would have taken before they were displaced (and maybe you have ideas?). Nevertheless, it seems clear that the content of those words belongs at the point of the caret mark.

A small point: you may think that διεγράψαμεν δὲ πρότερον πῶς is awkward; and I would agree. Yet the construction is not unbelievable as referring back to διακεῖσθαί πως, because that phrase is a stock phrase which stands for something pointed out in connection with virtues and vices but needing further specification (see πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαί πως, NE 1106a5-6), and the EE author just conceivably thinks of the chart of virtues and vices as going a long way toward providing that sort of specification.

περὶ δὲ σω-
φροσύνης καὶ ἀκολασίας μετὰ ταῦτα διελέσθαι πειρα-
τέον. λέγεται δ' ὁ ἀκόλαστος πολλαχῶς. ὅ τε γὰρ μὴ κε-
κολασμένος πως μηδ' ἰατρευμένος, ὥσπερ ἄτμητος ὁ μὴ

1230b.1
τετμημένος, καὶ τούτων ὃ μὲν δυνατός, ὃ δ' ἀδύνατος·
ἄτμητον γὰρ τό τε μὴ δυνάμενον τμηθῆναι καὶ τὸ δυ-
νατὸν μὲν μὴ τετμημένον δέ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸ
ἀκόλαστον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πεφυκὸς δέχεσθαι κόλασιν,
1230b.5
καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν μὴ κεκολασμένον δὲ περὶ ἁμαρτίας,
περὶ ἃς ὀρθοπραγεῖ ὁ σώφρων, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες· κατὰ ταύ-
την γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται τὴν ἀκολασίαν. ∧ ἔτι δ' ἄλλον
τρόπον οἱ δυσίατοι καὶ οἱ ἀνίατοι πάμπαν διὰ κολάσεως.
πλεοναχῶς δὲ λεγομένης τῆς ἀκολασίας, ὅτι μὲν περὶ ἡδο-
1230b.10
νάς τινας καὶ λύπας εἰσί, φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι ἐν τῷ περὶ ταύ-
τας διακεῖσθαί πως καὶ ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσι καὶ τῶν ἄλ-
λων· διεγράψαμεν δὲ πρότερον πῶς. [ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ὀνομά-
ζοντες μεταφέρομεν]. τοὺς δὲ ἀκινήτως ἔχοντας δι' ἀναι-
σθησίαν πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ἡδονὰς οἳ μὲν καλοῦσιν ἀναισθήτους,
1230b.15
οἳ δὲ ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι τοιούτους προσαγορεύουσιν.

Thread from the Translation Workshop

Here's a loose thread from last week's 'Translation Workshop', a curious passage from the Eudemian Ethics and something of a parallel. The trouble, provided by the highlighted sentence, requires in solution something more, I think, than careful attention to words in translation or even parsing of structure can offer:

πλεοναχῶς δὲ λεγομένης τῆς ἀκολασίας, ὅτι μὲν περὶ ἡδονάς τινας καὶ λύπας εἰσί, φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι ἐν τῷ περὶ ταύτας διακεῖσθαί πως καὶ ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· διεγράψαμεν δὲ πρότερον πῶς τὴν ἀκολασίαν ὀνομάζοντες μεταφέρομεν. (1230b9-13)

which Solomon renders:

But though 'profligacy' has more than one sense, it is clear that the profligate are concerned with certain pleasures and pains and that they differ from one another and from the other vicious characters in being disposed in a certain manner towards these; and we described previously the way in which we apply the term 'profligacy' by analogy.

Now there are two problems presented by the highlighted clause.

The first is that akolasia is not discussed so much as merely mentioned earlier in the treatise, and certainly the origin of the word for it is not.

The second problem, much more serious, is that the verb used to refer to that earlier discussion, διαγράφω, although it can mean 'describe', more exactly means 'to mark out or mark off, as with lines', and is elsewhere in the Eudemian Ethics used always to refer to the chart of virtues and vices at 1221a1-- and yet clearly the etymology of the word akolasia is not even the sort of thing that could be depicted in a chart.

Solomon's note to the sentence takes account only of the first of these difficulties: "This seems to refer to words which must have been lost at Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1221a 20".

------
Fyi, the fuller preceding context is this, which I provide because I think a proper solution needs to make use of this.

λέγεται δ' ὁ ἀκόλαστος πολλαχῶς. ὅ τε γὰρ μὴ κε-
κολασμένος πως μηδ' ἰατρευμένος, ὥσπερ ἄτμητος ὁ μὴ
1230b.1
τετμημένος, καὶ τούτων ὃ μὲν δυνατός, ὃ δ' ἀδύνατος·
ἄτμητον γὰρ τό τε μὴ δυνάμενον τμηθῆναι καὶ τὸ δυ-
νατὸν μὲν μὴ τετμημένον δέ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸ
ἀκόλαστον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πεφυκὸς δέχεσθαι κόλασιν,
1230b.5
καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν μὴ κεκολασμένον δὲ περὶ ἁμαρτίας,
περὶ ἃς ὀρθοπραγεῖ ὁ σώφρων, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες· κατὰ ταύ-
την γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται τὴν ἀκοκασίαν. ἔτι δ' ἄλλον
τρόπον οἱ δυσίατοι καὶ οἱ ἀνίατοι πάμπαν διὰ κολάσεως.
πλεοναχῶς δὲ λεγομένης τῆς ἀκολασίας, ὅτι μὲν περὶ ἡδο-
1230b.10
νάς τινας καὶ λύπας εἰσί, φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι ἐν τῷ περὶ ταύ-
τας διακεῖσθαί πως καὶ ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσι καὶ τῶν ἄλ-
λων· διεγράψαμεν δὲ πρότερον πῶς τὴν ἀκολασίαν ὀνομά-
ζοντες μεταφέρομεν.

Solomon's translation:

The term 'profligate' (unchaste) has a variety of meanings. It means the man who has not been (as it were) 'chastised' or cured, just as 'undivided' means one that has not been divided; and these terms include both one capable of the process and one not capable of it: 'undivided' means both that which cannot be divided and that which though it can be has not been; and similarly with 'unchaste'--it denotes both that which is by nature incapable of chastening and that which, though capable, has not actually been chastened in respect of the errors as regards which the temperate man acts rightly, as is the case with children; for of them it is in this sense that the term 'unchaste'¹ is used, whereas another use of it again refers to persons hard to cure or entirely incurable by chastisement. But though 'profligacy' has more than one sense, it is clear that the profligate are concerned with certain pleasures and pains and that they differ from one another and from the other vicious characters in being disposed in a certain manner towards these; and we described previously the way in which we apply the term 'profligacy' by analogy.

Can You Identify This Passage?

Here's a passage I like for its colorful writing. But can you identify it? (And although monkeys never would type it, they too could very easily google it.)

Aristotle, in his book of Politics, when he conies to compare the several kinds of government, he is very reserved in discoursing what form he thinks best: he disputes subtilely to and fro of many points, and judiciously of many errors, but concludes nothing himself. In all those books I find little commendation of monarchy. It was his hap to live in those times when the Grecians abounded with several commonwealths, who had then learning enough to make them seditious. Yet in his Ethics, he hath so much good manners as to confess in right down words that "Monarchy is the best form of government, and a popular estate the worst." And though he be not so free in his politics, yet the necessity of truth hath here and there extorted from him that which amounts no less to the dignity of monarchy; he confesseth it to be, first, the natural and the divinest form of government; and that the gods themselves did live under a monarchy. What can a heathen say more?

Note: 'conies' does indeed come from the word for rabbit (as in Pepys diary, "I find that a coney skin in my breeches preserves me perfectly from galling") and is cousin to 'cunning'.

"I'd Like to be Known as 'The Big Aristotle'"

According to Wikipedia, his nicknames include "The Diesel", "The Big Daddy", "Superman", "The Big Cactus", "Wilt Chamberneezy", "The Big Baryshnikov", "The Real Deal", and (after recently gaining an MBA degree) "Dr. Shaq".

But surely the best, greatest, and most honorable nickname of Shaquille O'Neal, the American basketball star, is "The Big Aristotle".

The nickname arose from a USA Today story in 2000, which tells of a motivational conversation O'Neal had with his stepfather:

Phil Harrison, his Army sergeant stepfather -- whom O'Neal always refers to as his real father -- had a pivotal phone conversation with his stepson when the playoffs turned intense. Harrison always had taught his stepson about compassion; a young O'Neal watched him give away bagfuls of White Castle cheeseburgers to homeless men. He rounded up O'Neal's entire boyhood basketball team and made them visit sick kids in a hospital at Christmas.

But this time Phil gave O'Neal a lecture instead about the importance of consistency in excellence:

This time, the lesson was harsh: There is no compassion for a loser. "In this world we live in," he told O'Neal, "if you win, you're probably going to be one of the greatest ever. If you don't, you're going to be a bum." Click.

O'Neal responded to the challenge and from that point began striving to excel not simply in occasional plays but rather throughout entire basketball games:

In fact, [O'Neal] called attention to his mind, not his brawn. "I'd like to be known as 'the Big Aristotle.' It was Aristotle who said excellence is not a singular act, but a habit."

(But where's the tatoo that says "Hexis not praxis"?)

End of Translation Workshop

Today I'll conclude my 'Translation Workshop' in an unusual way. I'm going to give solely my rendering of the final few lines, but I'll do so giving the context of the entire passage in Greek. The reason for this strange way of proceeding is that the most difficult decisions for rendering the final lines involve discerning the structure of Aristotle's reasons, not his choice of particular words or phrases, and in fact some of that structure reaches back to much earlier in the passage. This was not recognized by any of the other translators (and I've been following the usual way of rendering things so far), so I'll discuss the final lines simply in relation to my own rendering. You'll see what I mean in a moment.

Below is the passage which we've been looking at, and I'll place the final lines to render in red. I'm also going to take liberty in formatting the passage, to bring something out that you probably did not notice:

τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἁμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι γάρ τινα ὁμοιότητα. πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου. οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε μετενηνέχθαι·

κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὔξησιν ἔχον, τοιοῦτον δὲ μάλιστα ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἥξει· ἄπληστος γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὔξει τὸ συγγενές, κἂν μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ὦσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν. διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηθὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι – τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον –

ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον. διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος.

The key here is γάρ at b13, the lectio difficilior (recall the critical apparatus which I gave here), the reading which I accept.

It's a characteristic of γάρ ('for', quia or enim) in Aristotle that it reaches back. Usually of course γάρ reaches back to the sentence immediately beforehand, and scribes and critics have looked for it to do so also here at b13, and that's why it was changed to δέ, because there's no obvious way in which it reaches back to the preceding sentence.

But in fact γάρ sometimes reaches back farther than that, sometimes very far back indeed, and this is one of those cases (I believe) in which it does: I take it to reach all the way back to Aristotle's observation at b3 that the term akolasia had been transferred on good grounds (οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε μετενηνέχθαι), and this sentence now provides the reason why the transference was well-grounded.

To give the reason, Aristotle articulates an analogy--this in accordance with standard Aristotelian doctrine, that it's an analogy which licenses the metaphorical extension of a term for one thing to another thing. Here the analogy is: as a child is related to the direction of his master, so, in a moderate person, the faculty of sense-desire is related to the reasoning part.

This, then, gives us the key to discerning the structure of arguments:

1. Everything between οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε μετενηνέχθαι at b3 and ὥσπερ γὰρ at b13 is a digression (on the meaning of 'disciplined' or 'well-restrained').

2. You might have thought that it was awkward that Aristotle had placed two clauses beginning διὸ δεῖ in close proximity, and indeed that would have been awkward. Only, as it turns out, the clauses are not in close proximity (logically, even though they are so locally): the first belongs to the digression, and the second belongs outside the digression.

3. Furthermore, as we shall see, the second dio clause introduces a supporting point hardly connected at all with the line of argument we've been following so far!

Here's how I would render:

[a dio clause, giving a supporting point, within the digression] .... That’s why sense desires need to be moderate and few, and not in any way resistant to reason. (that’s the sort of thing we refer to it as ‘docile’ and ‘well-restrained’).

[outside the digression] --since, as a child needs to live under the direction of his guardian, so too the sense-desiring part needs to live under reason.

[a dio clause, giving a new supporting point/corollary altogether] That’s why the sense-desiring part needs ‘to agree with’ the reasoning part: (i) The attractiveness of the action is a target for both of them. (ii) And a moderate person has sense-desire only for the things he should, and in the way that he should, and at the time that he should; and reason issues orders in that way also.

What's the significance of this last supporting point? Understand διὸ δεῖ here to mean, in effect, "that's the sense in which it's right to say that the sense-desiring part needs to 'agree with' reason". (Beresford intuited that something like this was being claimed, and so he put scare quotes around 'to agree with'.)

This is a point which I believe is directed against Plato. Aristotle himself is not committed to saying that one part of the soul should 'agree with' (συμφωνεῖν) another part. But he does want to account for the naturalness of that way of speaking, and the discussion that he has just finished, in which the epithumetikon part was shown to be analogous to a child, gives him a good occasion for accounting for that way of speaking, viz. for just the same reason that one can say that a moderate person is 'well-disciplined' (viz. the analogy he has given), one can say such things as that the epithumetikon 'agrees with' reason. (And then in the last two clauses, σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν κτλ., Aristotle gives the non-metaphorical cash-value of this way of speaking.)

And just think that articles have been written, too, about the significance of συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ here, when it's not even something Aristotle is defending in his own voice!

A Greek Idol, part III

Once again, it's not too late to join this show. Also, if you have on hand another translation which you think is better in some places than the ones we are considering, please feel free to post that for our benefit. (I'm on break this week and cannot easily get at my office, e.g. Irwin or Ostwald.)

Once again, here's the Greek:

εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἥξει· ἄπληστος γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὔξει τὸ συγγενές, κἂν μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ὦσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν.

Here are the offered translations:

(Senn) If, therefore, [a child or appetite] is not obedient—and [not obedient] to the ruling [entity]—then it will go too far; for, in the one who lacks understanding, the longing for what's pleasant is unfulfillable—unfulfillable even [if filled] from every [source]; and the actualization of the appetite increases what is inborn, and if [the appetites] are great and vehement, they will drive out even reasoning.

(Beresford) So [in either case] unless it does as it’s told and is under the ruling element it will run amok, because desire for pleasure, in a thing without sense, is insatiable and is set off by anything. Also, the exercising of desire [in adults] will cause its connate [faculty] to grow, and when desires are big and extreme they even knock out deliberation.

(Pakaluk) So if such a thing isn’t docile, and doesn’t follow the thing that has authority over it, it will grow too large. Why? Because:

1. its wanting pleasure is something that can’t be satisfied, and
2. in a thing which itself lacks direction, the wanting of pleasure is occasioned by anything at all; and
3. the activation of any sensual desire leads to the increase of anything akin to it; and
4. when sensual desires are strong and intense, they even deflect rational reflection.

(Rowe) If, then, whatever desires shameful things is not ready to obey and under the control of the ruling element, it will grow and grow, for the desire for the pleasant is insatiable and indiscriminate, in a mindless person, and the activity of his appetite augments his congenital tendency; and if his appetites are strong and vigorous, they knock out his capacity for rational calculation as well

(Taylor) ... so if it is not made submissive and subject to some control, it will grow to a large extent. The appetite for pleasure is insatiable and attacks the thoughtless person from all sides, and the actual occurrence of bodily desires increases that aspect of our nature, especially if they are strong and intense, and if they drive out rational thought.

(Ross/Urmson) If, then, it is not going to be obedient and subject to the ruling principle, it will go to great lengths; for in an irrational being the desire for pleasure is insatiable and tries every source of gratification, and the exercise of appetite increases its innate force, and if appetites are strong and violent they even expel the power of calculation.

Remarks:

1. ‘docile’/ ‘doesn’t follow’: I understand Aristotle to mean two different things by εὐπειθές and ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον. The former I think is meant to signify an attitude or manner; the latter some pattern of behavior. (The former, if you will, is dispositional, the second law-like.) That’s why I’ve not followed Beresford’s appealing ‘does as it’s told’ for εὐπειθές, because that phrase combines two things that Aristotle (I think) wished to introduce separately.

2. ‘follows the thing that has authority over it’ (ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον)— It’s not ruling, but authority, which Aristotle has in mind: what is precisely at stake is whether what has authority succeeds in ruling. ‘Subject to some control’ (Taylor) is therefore too indefinite; ‘subject to the ruling principle’ (Ross/Urmson) gets the sense right, but its connotation is such that it can’t easily be applied to the child/guardian relationship, which Aristotle’s phrase is meant to cover also. (Senn’s ‘subject to the ruling entity’ and Beresfords’s ‘under the ruling element’ are slightly better.)

3. ‘it will grow too large’ (ἐπὶ πολὺ ἥξει)—I think this is the proper sense of the expression. ἥξει suggests arrival at a stopping point in a some process of development or growth; ἐπὶ πολὺ signifies that the grow has gone too far, beyond its proper limits or scope. The best analogue in the Aristotelian corpus is τὸ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀφικνεῖσθαι, Magna Moralia 1213b6, where the author argues that, just as all natural powers, because of an inherent weakness, have a limited extension of their operation, so too the capacity for friendship can only ‘go so far’: ἐφ' ἁπάντων γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐξαδυνατεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ φύσις ἀσθενὴς οὖσα πρὸς τὸ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀφικνεῖσθαι. (See also Nic. Eth. 1121b16, καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολύ, stinginess ‘has an extensive influence on us’).

4. 'Why? Because ... ' (γάρ): now there come four reasons why it will grow excessively. How we render these reasons must depend on our understanding of what the reality is that Aristotle wishes to describe. There is no getting around that, because Aristotle’s phrases are too clipped to allow us to guess the meaning simply from a contemplation of his language. Rather, we must have in mind a reality which we then can see the language as appropriately discussing. As might be expected, there is a logic to the reasons Aristotle provides:

1. Epithumia contains no inherent or intrinsic principle which would place a limit on its growth: ‘its wanting pleasure is something that can’t be satisfied’
2. Epithumia has no external limits, because nearly anything can stimulate it: 'in a thing which itself lacks direction, the wanting of pleasure is occasioned by nearly anything'. Here the ending -θεν suggests direction from, and πανταχόθεν is meant to signify, I think, that the stimulus for sense desire, for an disciplined child or adult, can come from any direction. (Aristotle has in mind a contrast, I think, with how a mature and reflective person won’t place himself in circumstances in which, or allow himself to perceive things by which, epithumia would predictably get stimulated.)
3. Not having any internal or external restrictions on its growth, epithumia moreover contains an inherent principle of expansion: ‘the activation of any sensual desire leads to the increase of anything akin to it.’ τὸ συγγενές means vaguely, I think, anything akin to some particular desire: e.g. (undisciplined) desire for this woman, if actualized (by imagination, action), tends to increase desires for other women; (undisciplined) desire for this extra food now tends to increase also desires for extra food at times before and after. The claim is general because there are hundreds of ways in which this works, as we all know from experience.
4. The growth of epithumia even tends to block the imposition of limits that would be placed upon it by (what Aristotle presumes to be) the naturally superior power of reasoning: ‘when sensual desires are strong and intense, they even deflect rational reflection.’

The progression therefore is: (1) no intrinsic limit; (2) no extrinsic limit; but (3) inherently expansive; and (4) becoming resistant to its natural principle of control. That's why it's best to give these in a list in a translation. Anyone giving four coherent reasons in such a short span of text would do so. Not to give them in a list is the distortion.