Pied Beauty

I said in an earlier post that Cicero seems to hold what might be called an 'expressive' theory of morality: that virtues and virtuous actions somehow manifest something, and that it is apparently part of their being honestum and inherently desirable that they do so.

But what does it mean to manifest something? Presumably manifestation is a relation between something to be manifested (call it 'm'), and something that manifests (call it 'M'). Here are some possibilities:

1. Manifestation as actualization: M stands to m as actualization to potentiality. Aristotle seems to hold this view at NE IX.7 1168a1-5:

u(peragapw~si ga_r ou{toi ta_ oi0kei=a poih&mata, ste/rgontej w3sper te/kna. toiou&tw| dh_ e1oike kai\ to_ tw~n eu)ergetw~n: to_ ga_r eu} peponqo_j e1rgon e0sti\n au)tw~n: tou~to dh_ a)gapw~si ma~llon h2 to_ e1rgon to_n poih&santa. tou&tou d' ai1tion o3ti to_ ei]nai pa~sin ai9reto_n kai\ filhto&n, e0sme\n d' e0nergei/a| (tw|~ zh~n ga_r kai\ pra&ttein), e0nergei/a| de\ o( poih&saj to_ e1rgon e1sti pwj: ste/rgei dh_ to_ e1rgon, dio&ti kai\ to_ ei]nai.

The analogue in ethics: a virtuous action actualizes something that existed beforehand only potentially in the soul

2. Manifestation as adornment: M is a whole which includes m as part, and the remainder of M is congruent to m. Think of finding the right frame for a picture. One might think that the correct frame somehow complements the picture (sc. is appropriate in size, color, material), so that the framed picture therefore better 'manifests' the picture. The analogue in ethics: a virtuous action changes nothing, and does not affect the virtue of the agent, but it is somehow the congruent or appropriate ordering of things and actions, given the existence of that virtue.

3. Manifestation as enhancement: M is a whole which includes m as part, and the remainder of M is congruent to m, in such a way that M's qualities appear greater. Think again of finding the right frame for a picture, but now one looks for a frame that somehow 'brings out' --makes to appear greater --features that m would have anyway. The analogue in ethics: a virtuous action changes nothing, and does not affect the virtue of the agent, but it somehow makes that virtue seem greater than it otherwise would have seemed. (It is clear how this notion of kalon would play no role in Platonic ethics, at least.)

4. Manifestation as consistency: M is something distinct from m which is such that it enjoys some kind of consistency or harmony (it is something consentaneum) with m. The claim is that some things somehow fit together, and other things do not, and that if an action is one that 'fits' with a virtue, then that 'shows' that the virtue is present and therefore manifests the virtue. Think of how a warm hat shows that the person wearing it is cold.

5. Manifestation as expression: here we simply take verbal expression as a primitive and say that M stands to m in much the same way that the verbal formulation of a thought (whatever that is) stands to the thought.

My tendency has been to interpret Ciceronian splendor in sense 5., because De Officiis opens by, in effect, demoting philosophy to a species of oratory; also, the work places so much stress on the importance of rational persuasion over force, that I am disposed to think that, for Cicero, a life of virtue simply is a matter of living a life with a certain persuasive force.