But Also This

As regards the problematic sentence, καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν, compare:

1102a17
καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν.

1161a16-17
καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα προσνέμεται

1161b16
καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαίνεται πολυειδὴς εἶναι

1161b24
καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου

1176a5
καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη·

In each of these, καί is adverbial, not conjunctive. Thus understand καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν as "But for a courageous person, too, courage is something admirable (kalon)."

So where's the difficulty? If I'm missing something, let me know.

Is 'Spark' a Technical Term?

I couldn't believe I was reading a paragraph in a sober journal (NDPR) written by an accomplished philosopher, rather than a "Dear Abby" column:

There's an important truth here. But it is only a half-truth: for while we must undoubtedly take responsibility for choices that smoothed the path to erotic love, we can't set out on that path at will. We can decide not to go to dinner, not to kiss goodnight, not to go out alone together rather than with friends, and so forth -- and so be responsible for falling in love when we shouldn't. But in the absence of a spark that is beyond the power of choice to summon, making all the opposite decisions won't manufacture erotic love. Without that crucial spark, one might doubtless embark on a successful marriage, but not aspire to erotic passion.

Someone might be tempted to counter: "If I went out to dinner (and had a couple of martinis too), kissed goodnight, and then went into the room together alone, I can assure you that there would be no need for any additional spark!" --But let's talk about that somewhere else, as well as about the other silly paragraphs in this review.

A Riddle within an Enigma

A strange sentence in a strange comment just published in BMCR:

Without appreciating the methodological questions raised in this recent scholarship,
Singpurwalla brings arguments against Weiss that cannot be sustained.

'Scholarship' means either the scholarly attainment of an individual, or a grant for study, but not scholarly literature or scholarly opinion. This solecism is unfortunately not uncommon.

Also, "Without appreciating" would naturally mean, "If she fails to appreciate", in which case the second clause should be "Singpurwalla cannot bring arguments against Weiss that can be sustained"--yet then one might wonder why her not appreciating something should have a bearing on whether her own arguments can be sustained.

Of course, what the editors wish to run is their business. But I personally fail to see how third-party replies to reviews, unless they are straightforward corrections, have a place in a journal such as BMCR. Leave that sort of thing to blogs (I say)!

Recitations of Immortality

I'm still puzzling over that passage from yesterday: I see for instance that Grant, in his annotated text of the Ethics, gives the same reading as the OCT; he doesn't obelize any line, or the passage; and he renders b21 as "Now to the brave man courage is something morally beautiful." Apparently Grant wouldn't agree with Taylor that b21 is ungrammatical. But to be continued ...

Today my thoughts are turning momentarily to immortality, as I am teaching the Phaedo in an introductory class.

While unpacking books, I came across William Ernest Hocking's 1957, The Meaning of Immortality in Human Experience. You may know that Hocking's earlier, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, was something of a philosophical blockbuster when it appeared in 1912. The much later immortality book was a repackaging of Hocking's earlier, Thoughts on Life and Death (1937), perhaps with the idea that, if the title were similar, this book too would prove to be a bestseller.

Hocking in his time was a high-profile professor at Harvard, whose lectures on immortality were originally given at:

Harvard, the Ingersoll Lecture on Immortality, 1936
Chicago, the Hiram W. Thomas Lecture, 1936
Berkeley, the Foerster Lecture on Immortality, 1942

The lecture series at Harvard was instituted by President Eliot and still persists in the Divinity School. The Berkeley series, I gather, also continues, although in both cases, I believe, the connection with philosophical discussions of immortality is slight. For instance, a recent Foerster lecture (2004) is described on the Berkeley website:

This year’s Foerster Lecturer, Carlo Ginzburg, is professor of Italian Renaissance studies at UCLA. His interests range from cultural and intellectual history to art history and methodology, though his special expertise is in the Inquisition. Ginzburg “is not only one of the world’s leading social historians,” says Foerster Lecture Committee Chair Anthony Long, professor of classics, but “a riveting author and lecturer, with a special gift for reminding us how much we have still to learn about the peculiarities of our species.” Ginzburg’s lecture is entitled “The Soul of Brutes: A 16th Century Debate.”

I wonder, especially given the mention of Anthony Long's presence on the committee, whether ancient philosophers discussing Platonic or Aristotelian arguments ever hold the Foerster lectureship? (I haven't a clue -- never heard of the lecture series before I encountered it in Hocking.)

Ungrammatical and incoherent?

Since there are no breaking events today in the world of ancient philosophy, here's a passage that has puzzled me, from Aristotle, EN III.7, 111b20-24. Note the obelized line:

τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας

ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. †καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν.†

τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει.

καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ

τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

C.C. W. Taylor in his recent Clarendon Aristotle volume renders:

The goal of every activity is what is in accordance with the state; and to the courageous person courage is something fine. So that is the nature of the goal; for each thing is determined by its goal. So it is for the sake of the fine that the courageous person endures and does courageous actions.

I'm quite confident that 'in accordance with the state' hardly has the meaning that Taylor wishes it to have!

But questions:

1. What's the argument here?
2. How to deal with that problematic line?

Taylor as regards 2. writes (as you might have guessed):

I follow Gauthier/Jolif and others in reading kai tōi andreiōi dē instead of OCT's ungrammatical kai tōi andreiōi de (dē is an emphatic particle, de the connective 'and', which merely duplicates kai.)

A Reason to Switch, Ipso Facto

A friend writes:

"You might consider going back to a Mac. Diogenes now includes LSJ and Lewis Short, and the former is linked to the TLG. No need for Perseus."

Yes, it's true: with the free search program available from Diogenes, those long waits for Perseus pages to load are now a thing of the past. One need only click on a word from searched text, and instantaneously the LSJ entry will show up in a split window.

Not that this alone could justify, for me, switching now to a Mac. However, if this Dell laptop . . . were to fall . . . accidentally . . . from my desk >>>
\\
>>>>
\\
* ($@*$)***)#$*$*&&!!!!

Asking the Right Question

They say that to make a discovery one needs to be able to pose the right question, and this, surely, is an example (from the Yale Working Group in Ancient Philosophy):

"Why Isn't Continence Enough for Practical Wisdom?"

Ursula Coope (Corpus Christi College, Oxford)

Tuesday, October 9, 5.45 pm

Connecticut Hall, Rm 104

Yale University

On " 'Pre-Socratics' "

I've sometimes put the term 'pre-Socratics' in scare quotes when using it (thus: "'pre-Socratics'", for you use-mention fans). Kurt Pritzl in his first lecture of the 'pre-Socratics' lecture series speculated that Diels-Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, was responsible for the term's influence and was perhaps even (derivatively in English) its origin. Someone else in a discussion on James Warren's Kenodoxia (here and here) has pointed to Grote's usage.

According to the OED, the provenance of the term is indeed German, but its first occurrence in English is from 1838, and Burnet was already using the term with scare quotes!

You may see for yourself what is apparently the first usage, in Morrison's translation of Ritter, here (courtesy, Google books).

A. adj. Of, relating to, or dating from the period before Socrates, spec. the sixth and early fifth centuries B.C.

1838 A. J. W. MORRISON tr. A. H. Ritter Hist. Anc. Philos. I. 179 (heading) History of the Pre-Socratic philosophy. 1856 J. H. SEELYE tr. A. Schwegler Hist. Philos. in Epitome III. i. 17 The universal tendency of the pre-Socratic philosophy is to find some principle for the explanation of nature. 1892 J. BURNET Early Greek Philos. 2 The common practice of treating this younger contemporary of Sokrates [sc. Demokritos] along with the ‘pre-Socratic philosophers’ has obscured the true course of historical development. 1957 G. S. KIRK & J. E. RAVEN Presocratic Philosophers p. vii, We have limited our scope to the chief Presocratic ‘physicists’ and their forerunners, whose main preoccupation was with the nature (physis) and coherence of things as a whole. 1974 Nature 8 Nov. 130/2 In the treatment of Greek science emphasis is laid upon the importance of the presocratic belief that causal relationships existed between natural phenomena. 2001 Brit. Jrnl. Hist. Sci. 34 380, An awareness of what might be called ontological objectivity..was implicit in the speculations and enquiries of some of the pre-Socratic thinkers, Plato and Aristotle.

B. n. Any of the Greek philosophers of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. who preceded Socrates.

1876 S. F. ALLEYNE et al. tr. E. Zeller Plato & Older Acad. p. viii, Character in relation to Socrates..To the pre-Socratics. 1889 Mind 14 603 It was transformed into a monism like that of the pre-Socratics. 1945 B. RUSSELL Hist. Western Philos. (1946) I. xiii. 126 ‘The Good’ dominated his [sc. Plato's] thought more than that of the pre-Socratics. 1972 E. HUSSEY Presocratics i. 1 What gives the group of Presocratics such unity as it possesses is..that all these men were involved in the movement of thought which led to the separation of science and philosophy from one another and from other ways of thinking. 1994 H. BLOOM Western Canon III. x. 261 While the pre-Socratics and Freud agree that there are no accidents, Austen thinks differently.

This Theory, That Belongs to Me, Goes As Follows

"You may well ask, 'What is it, that it is, this theory of mine on Anaximander?' My theory, that belongs to me, is as follows. This is how it goes. This theory goes as follows, and begins now."

(Here's the link, if you haven't seen that hilarious Monty Python skit, of Anne Elk's theory of the brontosaurus, 3 min 36 sec.)

Actually, I don't have much of a theory, or much that I'd wish to stake anything on, but more like a hunch. This hunch, which is mine, is as follows...

What is meant to have prominence, I think, in the highlighted sentence below, is the notion of destruction or perishing. The sentence, in the context, introduces that notion for the first time in the passage, after, so far, only talk of origins and coming to be:

Of those who say that it is one, moving, and infinite, Anaximander, son of Praxiades, a Milesian, the successor and pupil of Thales, said that the principle and element of existing things was infinite, being the first to introduce this name to the material principle. He says that it is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but some other infinite nature, from which come into being all the heavens and the worlds in them. And the source of coming-to-be for existing things is that into which destruction, too, happens by necessity. (ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι.) For they pay penalty and compensation to each other for injustice according to the order of time. It is clear that he, seeing the changing of the elements into each other, thought it right to make none of these the substratum, but something else beside these. And he produces coming-to-be not through the alteration of the element, but by the separation off of the opposites through the eternal motion.

Exactly what thought about perishing the sentence is meant to convey, is difficult to say. At least: whatever comes to be also perishes. From this Anaximander might have reasoned, intuitively:

1. Coming-to-be and perishing are corresponding processes.
2. Thus, end points of perishings and starting points of comings-to-be have the same status.
3. Thus, end points of perishings are as likely candidates for the most basic principle (archē) and element (stoicheon), as are starting points of comings-to-be.
4. But everything (or: every putative element) may be seen either among starting points or among end points. (Indeed, since the seas are drying up, dryness is an end point, as much as wateriness is a starting point.)
   
5. Thus, there is no reason to pick any one thing rather than another to be the most basic principle and element.
6. Thus, the most basic principle and element is something different and apeiron.

This gives an argument for why the archē and stoicheon is something apeiron (which is what was needed at that point in the passage from Simplicius); it does so by drawing out implications from the fact and necessity of perishing (which is what is stressed in the relevant sentence); and it is at bottom an indifference argument (step 5), a type of argument which we have reason to think Anaximander favored.

Furthermore, a line of thought such as this would have been a natural development from the position of Thales, because, whatever we think of Aristotle's reconstruction of Thales' reasons for positing water as the archē, it seems likely that Thales looked simply to the origins of things to justify his view -- and then Anaximander would be offering a significant correction in insisting that the end points of processes of perishing (especially the drying up of the earth) have parity.

Moreover, the view leads naturally to Heraclitus, because it is a short step from holding that coming-to-be and perishing are corresponding processes, to holding that, in fact, anything that counts as the one is, at the same time, an instance of the other -- which perplexes Plato in the Phaedo ("When a pair is separated, is that the phthora of the pair or the genesis of each individual?"), and Aristotle in de Gen et Corr.

As for the famous 'fragment'-- "they pay penalty and compensation to each other for injustice"--its function, on this interpretation, would be to give a reason, figuratively, for why everything that comes to be also perishes. Since its language is figurative, we should not, I think, place much weight on on the fragment; and, indeed, the subject matter is inherently difficult. (Exactly why, indeed, must everything that comes to be also perish?)

The intuition of Plato on this point was that a 'becoming' was between being and nothingness and therefore was inherently unstable. Other philosophers have held that anything that comes to be must be composite, and every composite is potentially divided, but any real potential must become realized in an indefinite length of time.

Anaximander's intuition, judging from the fragment, is that whatever comes to be is, to that extent, somehow 'in debt'--perhaps because the 'cost' of its existing is that something else that it excludes cannot exist--and that this debt must eventually be 'repaid', which is its perishing.

I am inclined to explain the 'debt' owed by any generated thing through an indifference argument: that something of one sort exist, rather than something of some other sort that it excludes, is, so far, irrational given the fact of an initial or background apeiron element--this irrationality becoming corrected through the perishing. (Note that such a debt might still be spoken of as a debt of one thing to something else, rather than to the apeiron, because the 'debt' is created by one thing's excluding something else.)

"And that is my theory. It is mine."

Gods, Rights, and Values

More on Anaximander later. But for today, I wished to notice Catherine Osborne's book, Dumb Beasts and Dead Philosophers, through drawing attention to this paragraph from a recent review:

In Chapter Seven ('On the Notion of Natural Rights: Defending the
Voiceless and Oppressed in the Tragedies of Sophocles') O. addresses
the connected questions of the appropriateness of speaking of rights in
general, and of using this language in speaking about animals. Through
a reading of Sophocles O. develops the argument that where in our own
time we tend to employ rights language to express moral outrage, other
forms of language were employed for the same purpose in antiquity, in
particular that of religion (182). Following this analysis, O. gives a
'Possible Historical Sketch' of how the vocabulary of rights developed.
O. concludes that what has occurred is the replacement of 'one set of
imaginary entities, the gods, with another set of imaginary entities,
rights', neither of which makes clear 'the real source of the
constraint . . . absolute moral value' (193). On this replacement of
imaginary entities, O. is very convincing, but the invocation of
'absolute moral value' here and elsewhere in the book is more
problematic. The existence of an absolute standard is asserted on
several occasions, but not really argued, raising the objection that
replacing both the gods and rights with absolute moral values appears
to be simply the introduction of a third imaginary entity or group of
entities to replace the previous two. The questions of the sense in
which these absolute values can be said to exist, how we can know about
them and how we can be sure that we perceive them and are not
perceiving something which is merely culturally constructed are also
not directly addressed.

Now suppose that by 'absolute moral value' Osborne means something like 'starting point' (or 'first principle of practical reason'). It seems right to say that the appeal to gods, and the appeal to rights, both play the role of a starting point or first principle in practical thought. It also seems right to say that roughly the same sort of starting point might be affirmed, either in the language of gods or in the language of rights.

If we grant this, then does Osborne really need to tell us 'how absolute values can be said to exist' and 'how we can know them' and 'how we can be sure we perceive them'?

One wonders: Can't those questions ever be put aside? Must they always be answered first? Is it inevitably a deficiency when they are not?

Or: Shouldn't the reviewer, then, first explain, before he raises his criticism, why he ultimately thinks that Osborne must do this, and how he can know that she must, and how he can be certain that he isn't simply going along with constructed cultural norms in insisting that she should?

The State of the Question, For Me

Some rules of thumb for the interpretation of a 'pre-Socratic' philosopher:

1. The interpretation of a fragment or attributed view should be the most economical interpretation of that fragment or attribution which is consistent with the following:
2. The philosophical view (taken to be) expressed should be such as earlier views might naturally have led to it directly (that is, the view might serve as a development, correction, application to a new domain, generalization, etc., of an earlier view).
3. The philosophical view (taken to be) expressed should be such as it might naturally have led directly to a later view (by way of development, correction, application to a new domain, generalization, etc.).
4. The philosophical view (taken to be) expressed is inherently interesting, clever, or profound.

I don't claim that this list is complete, but it is a good start.

Note that 2. and 3. serve to place a philosopher in a sequence of thought.

I state these rules of thumb because they capture what I think is wrong with the usual interpretation of the Anaximander 'fragment' -- which, it seems to me, offends against all four.

The usual interpretation goes much beyond what the fragment says (contrary to 1.); it does so with reference to a general view about cyclical change in nature which any philosopher at any time in the 6th-4th centuries BC might have thought (contrary to 2. and 3.); and, when given precise content in relation to the actual words of the fragment, the view is hardly coherent and seems actually to contain a contradiction (contrary to 4.).

This by way of summary.

But it's easy to be critical. Someone might challenge me to come up with something better, and I'll try to do that tomorrow or the next day.

No Pun Intended

Well, I suppose it all depends on what one means by "whet". According to some dictionaries, it means "to make more acute":

Any reader who shares this curiosity and turns to the opening "problem"
of Book 1 will encounter the following question: "Why are testicles of
cockerels fed on milk large and easy to digest?" It would be a mistake
simply to raise an eyebrow and not read on, however, as there is
interesting material in what follows. For in answering this question,
the author refers to "the testicles of both females and males" (pp. 91
& 93). But female "testicles" (i.e., ovaries) were unknown to
Aristotle, as their discovery was (as we are told in a note) "one of
the achievements of Hellenistic anatomy" (93 n. 162). So in the very
first "problem" we learn something about the relationship of this (part
of the) work to the thought of Aristotle.

To whet the readers' appetite, and to illustrate further that not
everything in this work is orthodox Aristotelianism, what follows is a
sample of "problems" that I found particularly interesting. ...

Still, I'm guessing that for Robert Mayhew, from whose review of Kapetanaki and Sharples' edition of Supplementa Problematorum the above was taken, no pun was intended.

A Contradiction in the Standard Interpretation

On the usual interpretation, the 'fragment' of Anaximander affirms an incessant struggle among opposites, amounting to warfare: one side perpetrates 'injustice' against the other; the other side retaliates by repayment, yet claiming even more ('surfeit', as KRS speculate); this in turn elicits a corresponding counterattack and additional injustice by the other side; and so on, presumably without end.

Kahn, approving of this interpretation, goes so far as to say that:

His words suggest an exchange of crimes like that which Herodotus presents as the antecedent for the Persian War, in which Greeks and Orientals are alternative offenders against one another: "this was the beginning of the wrongs done (adikēmatōn) . . . after this the Greeks were guilty of the secondary wrongdoing (adikiēs)"(Hdt. 1.2.1).

I've pointed out already that, whatever the words of the fragment may suggest to someone, they certainly require no such interpretation.

But here I simply wish to point out that it would be a contradiction to refer to a state of warfare, constituted by alternating injustice, as a taxis (order, arrangement). Warfare is not a taxis, nor can it be correct to speak of it as taking place in accordance with a taxis.

The proper phrase in Greek, I believe, for association under a taxis would be, not "paying dikē to each other" but rather, "paying and receiving dikē" -- the 'receiving' here being the crucial qualification, as it implies a willingness to be subject to arbitration and law. Warfare, in contrast, is precisely the lack of subordination to law.

This point is fudged in some translations by the use of a phrase such as "according to the assessment of time" to render kata tēn tou chronou taxin. By that phrase, the taxis mentioned in the fragment would be simply the rule whereby someone who commits an injustice has to make equivalent repayment (an 'assessment'). But that sort of taxis would exist only within any of the alleged cycles of injustice-repayment (and not even there, if, as KRS have it, the party requiring repayment looks for more than an equal share and attains to a 'surfeit'!). On that reading there would be no taxis that stretched across cycles of injustice-repayment, just as there is no taxis that governs warfare.

The standard interpretation, it seems, glides effortlessly from a putative taxis within a cycle to a taxis governing all cycles -- hiding the contradiction by which warfare is called lawfulness.

Of course one man's contradiction is another man's paradox, and I'm willing to allow that Heraclitus embraced a similar a paradox. But I cannot see any special merit antecedently in an interpretation that would turn Anaximander into Heraclitus.

Some Thoughts on Interpretation

Suppose that, in an ancient author, one found two clauses in succession, having the following structure:

(Clause A) X and Y, in accordance with Z;
since
(Clause B) W and V, in accordance with Z'.

where Z' was evidently a gloss upon or rephrasing of Z.

In that case, wouldn't it be antecedently likely that W was meant to correspond to X, and V to Y?

Also, since Clause B were ostensibly proposed as an explanans, and Clause A as the explanandum, an interpreter would antecedently be disposed to understand the meaning of Clause A in terms of Clause B. Clause B would be the more decisive in our determining the meaning of both.

... Or at least this last rule is what would hold in typical circumstances. ...

But suppose in the particular case before us, Clause B were evidently poetical and metaphorical, whereas Clause A employed terms which appeared precise and perhaps even technical. Then, it seems to me, the authority of the clauses would be at least equalized and maybe even reversed. One might in that case be disposed to use Clause A to interpret the meaning of the more metaphorical, and therefore more obscure, Clause B. Clause A would become at least as decisive, or maybe even more so, in determining the meaning of both.

I offer these remarks to explain why I began this series of posts last week by asking whether in "they pay penalty (dike) and retribution (tisis) to each other" two distinct things were meant or only one. It seemed to me that, if two distinct things were meant, then initially we should want to map each of these onto the two items distinguished in the preceding clause. At least, that ought to be our first instinct as interpreters. However, if that were to fail, then we would need to take a different approach. (I think it does fail.)

You might of course point out to me that it is now the standard view, in interpretations of Simplicius on Anaximander, to say that his Clause B has nothing whatsoever to do with his Clause A! The 'fragment' is saying something entirely different from the clause, evincing a 'Peripatetic sentiment', which precedes it.

Well, yes, that's true -- on the usual interpretation of the 'fragment' as affirming incessant cycles in a war among opposites. But I tend to think: so much the worse for that interpretation-- an interpretation which is in any case not implied by or required by the text.

But, to be continued....

Ancient Greek, To Die For

Seen posted on the Facebook wall of a young homeschooler friend beginning her study of Attic Greek:

Congratulations S.! I love that alphabet! you're right, it is beautiful. The way M. and I taught it to ourselves was by singing it to "I've been working on the railroad" it's really fun, I should show you sometime. I love Greek. and I love Latin. and I'm learning both, so I'm happy!

And later...

OH MY GOSH! OH MY GOSH! OH MY GOSH! are you as obsessed with Greek as I am. I just did some declension and vocabulary memorization today, and that set off the bomb! IT IS SO AMAZING AND BEAUTIFUL!!!! AAAAAHHHHH!!!!! *spazzzzz* . . . . . . . . . . . *dies*

A "B" or not a "B"?

Today I'm bothered by an argument from KRS which previously seemed just fine.

They say (recall):

Simplicius is undoubtedly quoting from a version of Theophrastus' history of earlier philosophy, and from the section on the material principle, περὶ ἀρχῆς. The concluding clause, a judgement on Anaximander's style, shows that what immediately precedes is a direct quotation.

This is the sole argument for counting the passage from Simplicius as containing a fragment of Anaximander.

For the moment we may put aside the question of whether someone might write, "saying these things in rather poetic (or 'more poetic') words", and aim to be referring simply to something that somewhere precedes, rather than to what immediately precedes.

What bothers me is the claim that "what immediately precedes is a direct quotation", which is ambiguous.

No doubt the clause, "saying these things in rather poetic words" indicates that someone is quoting someone. But who is quoting whom? Or, whose judgment on someone's style is being expressed? In particular, couldn't the phrase have been written by Simplicius?

Here is my reasoning. If the phrase, "saying these things in rather poetic words", were written by Theophrastus, then he would presumably be quoting Anaximander. But if the phrase were written by Simplicius, then he would presumably be quoting only Theophrastus.

If the phrase, "saying these things in rather poetic words", were written by Theophrastus, then he would be expressing a judgment about the style of Anaximander, presumably from direct inspection of something written by Anaximander, and in that case we would have good grounds for saying that the preceding contains somewhere a direct quotation of Anaximander.

But if the phrase were written by Simplicius, then the judgment would be expressed by Simplicius about the style of Anaximander, but presumably without any such direct inspection, and we would so far only have grounds for saying that the preceding contains somewhere a direct quotation of Theophrastus.

On the latter alternative, our grounds for regarding some words as constituting a genuine fragment of Anaximander would amount to no more than Simplicius' observation (and perhaps ours, by substitution) that a form of words was particularly poetical.

Or the point may be put this way. Remove that phrase from Simplicius (as being by Simplicius and having no real authority) and then from the following what do you say is the "B" passage and genuine fragment?

Of those who say that it is one, moving, and infinite, Anaximander, son of Praxiades, a Milesian, the successor and pupil of Thales, said that the principle and element of existing things was infinite, being the first to introduce this name to the material principle. He says that it is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but some other infinite nature, from which come into being all the heavens and the worlds in them. And the source of coming-to-be for existing things is that into which destruction, too, happens by necessity. For they pay penalty and compensation to each other for injustice according to the order of time. It is clear that he, seeing the changing of the elements into each other, thought it right to make none of these the substratum, but something else beside these. And he produces coming-to-be not through the alteration of the element, but by the separation off of the opposites through the eternal motion.

But am I missing something here, some reason why KRS have judged that the comment about style simply couldn't be by Simplicius? After all, the passage that follows ("It is clear that he ...") they say is "almost certainly" a comment by Simplicius. Am I overlooking something obvious (which can easily happen)?

Yale Working Group Series, Fall 2007

The Working Group in Ancient Philosophy at Yale has put together an excellent series for Fall 2007.

The first event is a presentation tomorrow by Adam Beresford, who will also be a commentator in BACAP:

Tuesday 25 September 5:45pm
Adam Beresford, UMass Boston. "Aristotle on Slavery".
Food served; Connecticut Hall Rm 104.

Tuesday 09 October 5:45pm
Ursula Coope, Oxford. Title and location TBA.

Tuesday 13 November 5:45pm
Hendrik Lorenz, Princeton. Title and location TBA.

Monday 26 November 5:45
Justin Broackes, Brown. "Locke on Substance".
Joint meeting of the Working Group in Ancient Philosophy and the Society for Early Modern Philosophy at Yale. Connecticut Hall Rm 104.

Further details for the 9 Oct and 26 Nov events will be made available on the Ancient Philosophy Calendar.

Is There a Need for Recycling?

If I go to market, to buy a loaf of bread, I exchange what is agreed to be an equivalent amount of money for the bread, and then so far my relationship with that merchant comes to an end. He does not approach me, nor do I approach him, unless I have some enduring need for bread. It is need which might make this cycle repeat itself.

If I go to market and steal a loaf of bread, and later the merchant makes me 'pay the penalty' for my injustice, my relationship with that merchant, again, so far comes to an end. The merchant does not take beyond what justice requires from me, and I do not steal again from him, unless one of us has some persisting pleonexia. Only pleonexia would make the cycle repeat itself.

Now Anaximander does not mention either need or pleonexia as pertaining to the elements, opposites, or substances. And that is why the passage about 'paying the penalty' does not itself imply any repetition of cycles of injustice and retribution. KRS must supply something like this on their own, in order to draw out that sort of conclusion from the fragment. Their conclusion is not based on any 'arguments from the [mere] form of the fragment'.

They begin their discussion of the fragment:

The constant interchange between opposed substances is explained by Anaximander in a legalistic metaphor derived from human society;

But the fragment does not itself mention constant interchange, and there is nothing in the context that indicates that constant interchange is the explanandum. (Nor of course does it mention opposed substances--but that's another difficulty.)

the prevalence of one substance at the expense of its contrary is 'injustice', and reaction takes place through the infliction of punishment by the restoration of equality

So far, no repeated cycles would be implied. For example, the prevalence of water on earth at the beginning of the cosmos is compensated for by the prevalence of fiery dryness at the end. Punishment has thereby been inflicted and equality restored. It's like: I steal bread from the merchant, and then I'm punished. That exchange is over.

Thus, to sustain their intended interpretation, KRS must add something:

... reaction takes place through the infliction of punishment by the restoration of equality--of more than equality, since the wrong-doer is deprived of part of his original substance, too. This is given to the victim in addition to what was his own, and in turn leads (it might be inferred) to κόρος, surfeit, on the part of the former victim, who now commits injustice on the former aggressor. Thus both the continuity and the stability of natural change were motivated, for Anaximander, by means of this anthropomorphic metaphor.

Their addition, "of more than equality", is entirely gratuitous, as the dash belies.

It cannot be denied that, if we knew ex ante that, in the fragment, Anaximander was intending to describe repeated cycles of change, then the metaphor would need to be interpreted along the lines that KRS suggest.

But if we do not presuppose such an interpretation (which would be to beg the question), then it seems that we cannot say that that is required by the fragment. Such an interpretation does not follow from 'the form of the fragment'.

(You might be wondering: What about the reciprocal term, ἀλλήλοις? Doesn't this imply more than one cycle? No, it doesn't. It certainly implies that there is more than one cycle, but it does not imply repeated cycles over time, or that all cycles have to be repeated over time. If, for example, somewhere fire dominates and is beaten back by water, and somewhere else water dominates and is beaten back by fire, then water and fire will have exchanged injustice with each other, and made each other pay the penalty.)

Did Anaximander Recycle?

We are familiar with the interpretation of Anaximander as affirming the cyclical character of all natural processes, the result of opposites gaining and losing ground against each other over time--a picture of stability through constant balanced change.

Yet do the reports of Anaximander's views of the natural world paint such a picture? Or does this picture rest solely on the fragment?

Actually Anaximander's most distinctive physical theories seem to be about processes that do not reverse themselves and are not cyclical. He postulates, for instance, that human beings a long time ago were born and lived like fish--with no suggestion that we return to living like fish in the future. Our watery existence was true of us, it seems, solely in an earlier age. He also held that the seas were drying up, and that eventually the entire face of the earth would become dry land.

KRS struggle with this last point:

It is clear that if Anaximander thought that the sea would dry up once and for all this would be a serious betrayal of the principle enunciated in the extant fragment, that all things are punished for their injustice; for land would have encroached on sea without suffering retribution.

Well, the fragment does not say that all things are punished for their injustice; it can, after all, take the interpretation, merely, that any injustice, when it occurs, eventually gets punished.

But in any case, what would be the unpunished injustice? Suppose the world comes into existence with all land submerged under oceans. That would be a gross 'injustice' committed by water against earth. However, over time all the water dries up. At that point earth will have claimed back a portion equal to the unjust portion originally claimed by water (a tisis). Tit-for-tat. Even stevens. A penalty equal to the original injustice. But--nota bene--no need for a new cycle.

KRS continue:

Further, although only the sea is mentioned, it is reasonable to conclude that, since rain was explained as due to the condensation of evaporation, the drying up of the sea would lead to the drying up of the whole earth. But could our whole interpretation of the fragment of an assertion of cosmic stability be wrong; could the drying up of the earth be the prelude to reabsorption into the Indefinite?

I say: 'yes' to both! But KRS disagree. They say that their interpretation of the fragment simply could not be wrong!

This it could not be, since if the earth were destroyed by drought that would implicitly qualify the Indefinite itself as dry and fiery, thus contradicting its very nature; and, in addition, the arguments from the form of the fragment still stand.

Not so: the earth's final perishing from a condition of complete dryness would no more qualify the Indefinite as dry and fiery, than the earth's first origination as inundated with water qualified the Indefinite as watery. The Indefinite, we might imagine, is capable of originating, and being the terminus of destruction for, any of the opposites (that would be just the point).

As to 'the arguments from the form of the fragment' -- that's for another post.

KRS save their theory by attributing to Anaximander a view that we have no evidence that he ever held:

The principle of the fragment could, however, be preserved if the diminution of the sea were only one part of a cyclical process: when the sea is dry a 'great winter' (to use Aristotle's term, which may well be derived from earlier theories) begins, and eventually the other extreme is reached when all the earth is overrun by sea and turns, perhaps, into slime.

A just-so story, it seems to me. And talk about cherry picking! Now a Peripatetic's view has become a very useful source of information about Anaximander!

Not Likely

Two ways of deciding upon the truth value of P:

1. By the Cartesian Canon: "It's possible that not-P; therefore not-P."
2. By the assessment of likelihood: "Not-P is more likely than P; therefore not-P."

Now which of these do KRS in their arguments below mean to exemplify? They are commenting on an excerpt from the passage in Simplicius:

... ἀλλ' ἑτέραν τινὰ φύσιν ἄπειρον, ἐξ ἧς ἅπαντας γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους· ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών. διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν, ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ λέγων·

Which they render as:

... some other apeiron nature, from which come into being all the heavens and the worlds in them. And the source of coming-to-be for existing things is that into which destruction, too, happens, according to necessity; for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the assessment of Time', as he describes it in these rather poetical terms.

Their commentary on the excerpt begins:

Simplicius is undoubtedly quoting from a version of Theophrastus' history of earlier philosophy, and from the section on the material principle, περὶ ἀρχῆς. The concluding clause, a judgement on Anaximander's style, shows that what immediately precedes is a direct quotation. Thus κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν, which many have held to be a Theophrastean paraphrase of κατὰ τὸ χρεών, should provisionally be accepted as original. διδόναι -- ἀδικίας is certainly original, and well exemplifies the poetical style noted by Theophrastus. κατὰ τὸ χρεών, too, should probably be accepted as by Anaximander: χρεών retained a marked poetical colouring (except in the special usage χρεών ἐστι) until the expression τὸ χρεών became popular in the Hellenistic period as a circumlocution for death...

So far so good; and the contrast between 'certainly' on the one hand, and 'provisionally' and 'probably' on the other, suggests reasoning by likelihoods. It's the remainder of the argument that worries me:

The preceding words, ἐξ ὧν -- εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι, have been much disputed. The use of the abstracts γένεσις and φθορά, well established in Peripatetic but not (from the other extant evidence) in Presocratic vocabulary, suggests that these belong to Theophrastus.

But although KRS use the word 'suggests', their argument seems too weak to yield a likelihood.

After all, we concede that Anaximander coined a strange word, ἄπειρον; we do not hesitate to consider that he might have taken a common word, ἀρχή, and used it with a new and technical sense; γένεσις and φθορά were not themselves technical terms over which Peripatetics had a proprietary claim; and Plato (not a Peripatetic) in referring back to early Greek natural philosophy uses the phrase, περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, as if this were an already well-established usage then. All of these things and more would need to be evaluated to establish a likelihood.

In short, it seems that this argument alone can 'suggest' something only if the Cartesian Canon is implicitly in force.

Next KRS continue:

The sentiment, too, looks Peripatetic: it is a close restatement of one of Aristotle's basic dogmas about the primary substance of the physical monists, 'all things are destroyed into that from which they came-to-be' (Phys. III.5, 204b33, ...).

Of course it's possible, too, that Anaximander actually said something along the lines of that which Aristotle ascribed to him! KRS' remark can establish only the possibility that the sentence is a Peripatetic interpretation rather than a quotation. It does nothing to establish a likelihood. (Oddly KRS later, on pp. 121-22, propose that ἐξ ὧν -- εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι is a Theophrastean paraphrase of something that Anaximander actually said. But one can't have it both ways: the clause either conveys Anaximander's 'sentiment' or it does not.)

KRS next add, by way of conclusion:

Theophrastus was given to quoting single words or phrases; thus, he could have quoted the concluding phrase of a sentence, the rest of which he had paraphrased, in order to emphasize the connexion with the following sentence which he quotes in full.

Indeed he could have done so. But similarly he could have quoted an entire sentence. Again, no likelihood is established by this argument (which is masked by the phrase, 'given to').

What would be relevant here, to establish a likelihood, is something like the following: In cases in which Theophrastus quotes an entire sentence, it is more likely than not that he introduces that quotation by leading in with a fragment of a preceding sentence; moreover, he is disposed to do so even when what is contained in that fragment is essentially repeated in the wholly quoted sentence (as in κατὰ τὸ χρεών / κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν).

Whether that is true or not, I don't know.