Johansen on OPSIS

1. Johansen begins by conceding that opsis can be used by Aristotle to mean the act of seeing, citing Bonitz' Index Aristotelicum, which gives passages in Historia Animalium in which the term evidently has this meaning. But what is at issue, he says, is whether it can naturally mean this in the specific context of DA.

2. He then points out that, in DA, Aristotle explicitly uses the term to indicate the faculty of sight and contrasts this with horasis, a term which Aristotle reserves for the act of seeing. Johansen maintains that (outside the passage that is in dispute) opsis is never used in DA to mean an act of seeing. Johansen cites 2.1.412b27-413a2 and 3.3 428a6-7. (He might also have cited--which, strangely he doesn't-- 3.2,426a13-14, which occurs in the very same chapter!) Here are all three pasages:

DA 2.1.412b27-413a2. As, then, the cutting of the axe or the seeing of the eye (horasis) is full actuality, so, too, is the waking state; while the soul is actuality in the same sense as eyesight (opsis) and the capacity of the instrument. The body, on the other hand, is simply that which is potentially existent. But, just as in the one case the eye means the pupil in conjunction with the eyesight (opsis), so in the other soul and body together constitute the animal. (Hicks)
w(j me\n ou}n h( tmh~sij kai\ h( o3rasij, ou3tw kai\ h( e0grh&gorsij e0ntele/xeia, w(j d' h( o1yij kai\ h( du&namij tou~ o)rga&nou, h( yuxh&: to_ de\ sw~ma to_ duna&mei o1n: a)ll' w3sper o)fqalmo_j h( ko&rh kai\ h( o1yij, ka)kei= h( yuxh_ kai\ to_ sw~ma zw|~on.

DA 3.3.428a6-7. Sensation (aisthesis) is either a faculty like sight (opsis) or an activity like seeing (horasis).
ai1sqhsij me\n ga_r h1toi du&namij h2 e0ne/rgeia, oi[on o1yij kai\ o3rasij

DA 3.2.426a13-14. The actualization of sight(opsis) is called seeing (horasis).
o3rasij ga_r le/getai h( th~j o1yewj e0ne/rgeia

3. Johansen then additionally gives a Bayesian argument to the effect that, given what Aristotle says in DA, the term opsis is not what one would expect, if Aristotle had wanted to indicate an act of seeing: "Given this precedence, if Aristotle meant to refer to the actuality of sight at DA III.2 425b13, it is quite unlikely that he would use the word 'opsis'."

A 'Default' Meaning for OPSIS?: Texts (Once Again)

I want to raise the question of what opsis (o1yij, 'vision') means at DA 3.2 425b12-17. This is crucial for deciding between the 'activity' and 'capacity' interpretations of the passage.

Johansen claimed in his BACAP seminar (i) that the 'default meaning' for the term in DA should be the faculty or capacity of sight, (ii) that the term can intelligently be read at 425b12-17 as having that sense, and therefore (iii) that the term should be read as having that sense (the 'capacity' interpretation').

Caston maintains, as against (i), that the term in DA can just as well mean an act of seeing; as against (ii) that it cannot intelligently be read at 425b12-17 as meaning anything other than an act of seeing; and as against (iii) that the term therefore should be read in that way (the 'activity' interpretation).

So here we have a good, old-fashioned, head-to-head dispute. Who is right? On each point, I'll give the arguments for both sides: readers of Dissoi Blogoi should then feel free to comment or render judgment. I'll also render my own judgment (hoping thereby to provoke dissent!).

First we need to consider (i), whether opsis has a 'default meaning' in DA, as Johansen claims, looking at the arguments on both sides. Here is the passage, once again, for ease of reference:

GREEK TEXT
)Epei\ d' ai0sqano&meqa o3ti o(rw~men kai\ a)kou&omen, a)na&gkh

h2 th~ o1yei ai0sqa&nesqai o3ti o(ra~, h2 e9te/ra. a)ll' h( au)th_ e1stai

th~j o1yewj kai\ tou~ u(pokeime/nou xrw&matoj, w3ste h2 du&o tou~

au)tou~ e1sontai h2 au)th_ au(th~j. e1ti d' ei0 kai\ e9te/ra ei1h h( th~j (15)

o1yewj ai1sqhsij, h2 ei0j a1peiron ei]sin h2 au)th& tij e1stai au(th~j:

w3st' e0pi\ th~j prw&thj tou~to poihte/on.

JOHANSEN'S TRANSLATION
Since we perceive that we see and hear, it is necessary [b12] that one perceives that one sees either by sight (opsis) or by some other [sense]. But the same [sense] will be [b13] of sight and the underlying colour, so that either there will be two [senses] [b14] of the same thing or it [the sense] will be of itself. And furthermore, if indeed the sense of sight were different [b15], then either it will go on to infinity or some sense will be of itself, [b16] so that we should do this in the case of the first [sense].

CASTON'S TRANSLATION
Since we perceive that we see and hear, it is necessary either by means of the seeing that one perceives that one sees or by another [perception]. But the same [perception] will be both of the seeing and of the colour that underlies it, with the result that either two [perceptions] will be of the same thing, or it [sc. the perception] will be of itself. Further, if the perception of seeing is a different [perception], either this will proceed to infinity or some [perception] will be of itself; so that we ought to posit this in the first instance.

Does Justice Exist?

I rethink Introduction to Philosophy every time I teach it.

This year I once again tried something different. I was inspired by a remark of my colleague, Walter Wright, who said that when he was an undergrad at Yale, one of his professors had solved the 'problem of Intro to Philosophy' (not the problems of philosophy) by simply teaching Plato's Republic. So that's what I attempted this year: introduce students to philosophy, by introducing them to the Republic, and the ethics, politics, epistemology, and metaphysics that it contains. (The text of the footnote, as it were.)

In the course I assigned an essay for which I set a modern Ring of Gyges problem: you're an executive in a Fortune 500 company, and you've noticed a problem in 'internal controls' which would enable you (it's a sure bet) to funnel off $500K without anyone ever noticing: bring forward considerations modelled on those of the Republic to explain why you wouldn't do so (or, contrariwise, explain why such considerations would leave you unaffected or unconvinced, perhaps in contrast to other considerations, which you take to be better).

One student included in his reply his own Ring of Gyges situation. It wasn't quite answering the question (yet) to give another example of the same sort of case, and yet it was noteworthy because he recognized it as the same sort of case, and the story in any case had an intrinsic interest:

I was working as a bartender in a loud Spanish club in Worcester when one man, after ordering his drinks and paying me with a twenty, left without retrieving his eight dollars change. I put the eight dollars in my pocket knowing there could be no negative consequence to this unjust act. There could be no possible reprimand as it could be assumed that because the man left, the eight dollars had either been forgotten, or had been intended as a tip. Rather than deriving a feeling of pleasure from the material gain of acting unjustly, as Thrasymachus would have expected, I was burdened with a feeling of discontent. After withdrawing out of sight to the back of the club for about an hour, the man retuned and ordered more drinks. The discontent that I felt from having unjustly acquired eight of the man's dollars compelled me to act justly, not from fear of reprisal or desire for praise, as Glaucon would have supposed, but merely because I value justness in and of itself.

Under the torment of the insufferably loud music I attempted to explain to the man that he had forgotten his change. He did not speak a word of English and continuously shook his head and denied the money. Eventually, to avoid confusion, I resorted to undercharging him by eight dollars on the next round. I felt a great deal of pleasure after acting justly and this pleasure was felt for justice's sake itself. It cannot be said that this was a pleasure felt from the consequences of acting justly, a pleasure derived from honor or respect earned in the eyes of the man whom I had treated justly. The man was unaware that he had forgotten his change and believed I had merely undercharged him; therefore, he felt no gratitude toward me for having treated him justly. Nor can it be said that I had acted justly out of fear or weakness, as I was the only person who knew that I had acted unjustly. This example challenges the assertion put forth in book II by Glaucon, that justice is of the lowest class of desirable things, things that are desired only for their consequences. I gained personal pleasure from acting justly in spite of the loss of tangible goods and without any gain of intangible goods such as admiration or respect. This is a pleasure that is felt Socrates says that this sort of pleasure is of the highest class of pleasures, pleasures of the soul.

(Posted with the student's permission.)

Ph.D.s Need Not Apply (Themselves)

Yes, I want to post something serious about whether opsis at DA 425a13-16 can mean an act of seeing. (Caston requires this; Johansen denies it.) But two words will explain why that may need to wait until tomorrow: papers, exams. I'm sure not a few readers of Dissoi Blogoi will understand. (That's litotes for you.)

Allow me, then, a light hearted post or two. Here's one for students only, or for other readers who do not claim to be doctors.

I like to include 'identification' questions on my final exams, especially for courses in which there is much reading, just to keep my students honest. Now mark the economy of providence: what was a terrifying trial for them, becomes now a pleasant recreation for us. (Two uses of schole, after all.)

So then: The following passages are from my History of Medieval Philosophy final. Identify the author and work. (If, on the off chance, something is by Aquinas, and it belongs in the Summa Theologiae, then you must specify I, IaIIae, or IIaIIae.) Give your answers as a 'Comment'. But beware: You'll be competing against Anonymous, who has already proved himself to be clever with those many intelligences that Howard Gardner talks about (or is with only one Intelligence, as the medieval philosopher . . . . . . . . . . . maintained?).

(Yes, it's true, most of these can be deduced. But shouldn't they be that way, if they're to be fair? That they're relatively easy... well, I was feeling indulgent when I wrote the exam. These could of course be made as difficult as one wants.)

1. "One day I would form the resolution to quit Baghdad and get rid of these adverse circumstances; the next day I would abandon my resolution. I put one foot forward and drew the other back. If in the morning I had a genuine longing to seek eternal life, by the evening the attack of a whole host of desires had reduced it to impotence. Worldly desires were striving to keep me by their chains just where I was, while the voice of faith was calling, 'To the road! to the road! What is left of life is but little and the journey before you is long. All that keeps you busy, both intellectually and practically, is but hypocrisy and delusion.'"

2. "In fact, everything else there is, except You alone, can be thought of as not existing. You alone, then, of all things most truly exist and therefore of all things possess existence to the highest degree; for anything else does not exist as truly, and so possesses existence to a lesser degree. Why then did 'the Fool say in his heart, there is no God' when it is so evident to any rational mind that You of all things exist to the highest degree?"

3. "On the basis of these statements, I laid down, along with other conclusions, one which was this: From the fact that some thing is known to exist, it cannot be evidently inferred, by evidence reduced to the first principle, or to the certitude of the first principle, that some other thing exists."

4. "As Augustine says, 'That which is not just seems to be no law at all.' Hence the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above. Consequently, every human law has just so much of the nature of law as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it departs from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law."

5. "[The reason I think that the interior sense is superior to the senses by which we perceive corporeal objects] is because I recognize that it is in some kind of way a ruler and judge among the other senses. If they failed in their duty it would be like a master demanding a debt from a servant, as we just recently were saying. The eye cannot see whether it has vision or not and therefore cannot judge where it is defective or where it is sufficient. That is what the interior sense does, as when it teaches a beast to open its eyes and supply what it perceives is lacking. No one doubts that he who judges is superior to that over which he exercises judgment."

6. "It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, that is, of man's appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Ps. 102.5, 'Who satisfieth thy desire with good things.' Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness."

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One Thing That's Not Wrong With Johansen's Interpretation

I want to call attention to Johansen’s understanding of one line, which I put in bold:

‘Since we perceive that we see and hear, it is necessary [b12] that one perceives that one sees either by sight (opsis) or by some other [sense]. But the same [sense] will be [b13] of sight and the underlying colour, so that either there will be two [senses] [b14] of the same thing or it [the sense] will be of itself….

As we saw, Johansen (in an “interpretative note”) remarked that the highlighted line is meant to apply to both the option that we perceive that we see by sight, and the option that we perceive that we see by some other sense. This seems reasonable. Since seeing consists of a sense faculty receiving a perceptible form, then a perceiving of this (however accomplished) will somehow have to take both of these under its scope.

In contrast, if we take the highlighted line to apply to only one option, say, the second, then various difficulties arise. There’s a lesson in this, as I shall explain.

Recall that I was puzzled by how, if capacities and activities are correlative, a ‘capacity reading’ could give a different result from an ‘activity reading’.—Presumably they cannot imply different results, but a philosophical view will be more naturally suggested by the one than by the other.

Nonetheless, that reminder, about how these views must in some sense be equivalent, serves as a useful check. It should lead us to examine, in the case of any objection raised against the one interpretation, whether it doesn’t also apply to the other interpretation; and, if there is a device that the one interpretation can usefully exploit, whether it can’t also be exploited by the other—because we would expect a fundamental parity between the two.

So, for instance, we saw in an earlier post that Caston wanted to maintain that a capacity reading of DA 3.2 was prima facie inconsistent with De Somno 2, and he presented this as if it were a difficulty peculiar to it. --But then later we saw that Caston effectively conceded that this was just as much a difficulty for an activity reading; and we saw that the same sort of harmonization that Caston suggested for the activity reading, could be used for a capacity reading as well. So on that point there is actually parity between the two views.

Yet the same thing happens here, in connection with the line I’ve highlighted above. When Caston gives an exposition of the capacity reading (on p. 765) he takes the highlighted clause to apply only to the option that it is a different sense from sight which perceives that we see. This leads to a variety of difficulties, which Caston draws out and appears to treat as if they applied only to the capacity reading. Yet later (on p. 771), when giving an exposition of the activity reading, Caston construes the line as applying to both options: “perceiving that we see is a perception both of our seeing and of the object seen”, he says. Yet that way of dealing with the line was also available to the capacity reading (as Johansen shows).

Presumably Caston took the capacity reading in that way because many of its defenders have done so. As he notes in footnote 33 on p. 765: “The restriction to cases where there is a distinct sense is not actually in Aristotle’s text, but is supplied by many translations and commentaries…The translations of Hicks and Smith are more faithful to the text; they represent the inference as following instead from the initial premise—namely, that we perceive that we see—which is neutral between the options Aristotle is considering”, and then he cites his own page 771 (and Osborne) as taking that better approach.

That’s all fine: but then one needs to add that the various objections Caston raises on p. 765 are an artifact of a faulty way of developing the capacity reading. In this respect, there’s parity between the interpretations.

Johansen's 'Capacity Reading'

Here is Johansen’s translation, once again, for reference:

‘Since we perceive that we see and hear, it is necessary [b12] that one perceives that one sees either by sight (opsis) or by some other [sense]. But the same [sense] will be [b13] of sight and the underlying colour, so that either there will be two [senses] [b14] of the same thing or it [the sense] will be of itself. And furthermore, if indeed the sense that is of sight were different [b15], then either it will go on to infinity or some sense will be of itself, [b16] so that we should do this in the case of the first [sense]. But there is a puzzle (aporia): for if [b17] perceiving by sight is seeing, and colour or what [b18] has colour is seen, [then] if something is going to see what sees (to horôn), then what first sees [or the first thing that sees] [b19] will also have colour. However, it is clear that perceiving by sight is not one thing; for even [b20] when we are not seeing, we discriminate both darkness and [b21] light by sight, but not in the same way. Moreover, what sees is actually (kai) coloured in a way [b22]: for the sense-organ is in each case receptive of the sense-object without [b23] the matter. That is why perceptions (aisthêseis) and appearances (phantasiai) are present in the sense-organs [b24] even when the sense-objects have departed.’

Here is Johansen’s schema of interpretation for the passage, which he gave on Thursday night. (I quote from the lecture with Johansen’s permission.):

1. Premise: We perceive that we see.

2. Premise: It is either A) by sight that we perceive that we see or B) by another sense.

3. Inference: The same sense will be of both i) sight and ii) colour.

Interpretative note: 3) applies to both options 2) A) and B) above.

4. Inferences: if 2 A), sight will be of itself (by 3 i)); if 2 B), two senses will have the same object (=colour by 3 ii)).

5. Further inferences: if 2 B), either a) there will for each perception that one is perceiving be another sense by which one perceives that perception, in which case there will be an infinite regress of senses, or b) some sense will be of itself.

But not a), so b). If b), best that the sense that is of itself is sight, so 2 A).

But if 2 A), there is an aporia: sight is of colour or what has colour [cf. DA II.7 418a29]; but if so, if what sees (to horôn) is seen, it too must have colour.

6. Aporia defused:

a) There is another way of seeing by sight than seeing colours, for when it is dark we discern by sight that we are not seeing.

b) What sees is in a way colored since the sense-organ receives the sense-object without its matter [i.e. the sense-organ receives the form]. That is why the perceptions and phantasiai can remain in the sense-organs to be perceived later.

It’s a neat and tidy interpretation. One might wonder what could be wrong with it.

Johansen v. Caston, Preliminary Recap

So where do we stand?

Caston says that DA 3.2 (beginning) is about the structure of consciousness, that Aristotle is maintaining that every act of sensation is at the same time a reflexive act of perception. Caston thinks that a ‘capacity reading’ of the text is not sustainable, and that an ‘activity reading’ is most naturally understood as concerned with this question of what the structure of consciousness is.

Johansen says that DA 3.2 is about the postulation of faculties, that Aristotle is maintaining that we do not need to postulate any faculty besides vision to account for perceiving that we see. Johansen thinks that an ‘activity reading’ of the text is not sustainable, and that a ‘capacity reading’ is most naturally understood as being concerned with this question of a whether extra faculties need to be postulated.

In a Newmanian fashion, we proposed the following ‘antecedent probabilities’:

• That, antecedently, Caston’s view was the more difficult to defend, since it was the stronger claim;
• That, antecedently, we would expect Aristotle to be taking the approach that Johansen claims, since the context of the passage in DA suggests that it would be concerned with faculties.

These antecedent probabilities suggest that we should first see whether in fact the capacity reading can’t be sustained—which is fitting anyway since Johansen defended a capacity reading in his BACAP lecture anyway.

So can it be sustained? How does Johansen interpret the passage? What are Caston’s objections to a capacity reading, and do they have force against Johansen’s interpretation?

A Saving, In Need of a Phenomenon

Aryeh Kosman perceptively remarked in his comments on Johansen last Thursday that what is at issue in interpreting DA 3.2 (beginning) is what the explanandum is. When Aristotle begins “Since we perceive that we see and hear…”, to what precisely is he referring? Some candidates:

1. ‘consciousness’, a primitive reflexive awareness present along with every act of sensation;
2. ‘self-consciousness’, a kind of self-presence, as in the ‘I think’ accompanying all perceptions;
3. sensing that a sense is simply operating (or not);
4. being self aware, that is, the state the truck driver on automatic pilot finds himself in, once he ‘comes to’ (in David Armstrong’s example);
5. paying attention to something that one is perceiving (similar to 3., but not global);
6. recognizing that you are a perceiving being, in effect, recognizing that you are an animal.

Caston thinks: 1. (That's clear.)

Kosman in his 1975 classic I believe holds 2.; but last Thursday he seemed to be saying that Aristotle is using language suggestive of 2. in order to get, rather, at 1. (But did I misunderstand?)

Johansen thinks (I believe): 4.

I tend to think that it’s 3. (Is this what Catherine Osborne holds as well? I don’t know, and apologize for not knowing--I haven’t had a chance to look at her article again and need to return to it. Johansen frequently cited it in notes, as does Caston in his article.)

Subtleties and Doubts

Stephen Halliwell has a beautifully crafted review in NDPR (read it here) of Radcliffe G. Edmonds III, Myths of the Underworld Journey: Plato, Aristophanes and the 'Orphic' Gold Tablets, Cambridge University Press, 2004, which relates inscriptions on the gold funerary 'leaves' or 'tablets' (lamellae) found in some ancient Greek graves to Aristophanes' Frogs and the myth in the Phaedo. As to the latter, Halliwell confesses (in a manner which will appeal to some readers of Dissoi Blogoi):

My one disappointment, however, is that while adopting such a sophisticated approach to the intricacies of Platonic mythopoeia, and after acknowledging the 'many levels' on which the dialogues can be read (161-2), Edmonds tends to lapse into a rather narrowly conventional view of what constitutes the Phaedo's 'communication between the absent author . . . and his audience' (161), talking repeatedly of arguments, reasons, and convictions espoused by Socrates in the work as though they could be straightforwardly identified as Plato's own (he can even speak of 'Plato's theories [sic] of punishment', 217 n. 177) and as though its philosophical conclusions were never in doubt. But this seems to underestimate the dramatic complexity and subtlety of the Phaedo, in which, for all his eloquence and fervour, Socrates never decisively convinces his companions to share his attitude to death.

But surely we can allow that the dialogue has 'dramatic complexity and subtlety' without also having to say, as is commonly said, but which seems false, that 'Socrates never convinces his companions'.

The strong and clever reasoner, Cebes, says at 107a2 "[F]or my part I've no further objection, nor can I doubt the arguments at any point" (Waterfield, ou)/koun e)/gwge... e)/xw para\ tau=ta a)/llo ti le/gein ou)de/ ph| a)pistei=n toi=j lo/goij), to which weak-minded Simmias agrees, "nor have I any further ground for doubt myself, as far as the arguments go" (ou)d' au)to\j e)/xw e)/ti o(/ph| a)pistw= e)/k ge tw=n legome/nwn, although admittedly Socrates at b5-10 recognizes that he might need some shoring up).

I'm not able to doubt your arguments in any respect. I have no grounds for doubting your arguments. --It's a little too much subtlety, I'd say, to convert a dialogue which ends with as firm an expression of conviction as one could wish, into one in which no one gets 'decisively convinced.'

Agreeing in Disagreeing

As I've said, Caston proposes an 'activity' reading of the opening of DA 3.2, Johansen a 'capacity' reading. And, whatever their disagreements, they seem agreed that the dispute may usefully be set up in this way, at least initially.

And yet I'm puzzled that that should be so. Johansen in his lecture nicely gave the reason why:

…by saying that Aristotle seeks to account for the soul in terms of its faculties we should by no means take it that his account of the soul is not also about the activities of these faculties. We should remember that the activity of a faculty is definitionally prior to the faculty (dunamis) (DA II.4 415a18-20). Given the definitional priority of activities over faculties, we should therefore expect that his starting point in identifying the faculties of the soul will often be an account of the soul’s activities. This, I shall suggest, exactly what we find in DA III.2: Aristotle here takes his starting point in the activity of perceiving that we see and hear and then asks what is the faculty that explains how we engage in this activity. His answer, I shall argue, is that it is the sense faculties themselves that explain it.

Caston makes a similar point, in connection with he calls a 'moderate capacity reading':

Most translations in fact conform to an extreme capacity reading. But I doubt whether anyone has ever really considered it seriously. Most discussions assume that we perceive that we are seeing on a given occasion (b12); and that it is not sight, but seeing (th=j o)/yewj, b14), that is perceived along with the colour seen. One can make these modifications, moreover, without competely foregoing a capacity reading. The argument's main concern can still be over which capacities are required for such perceptions. All that has changed is that the object of such perceptions will be the activity of these capacities, not the capacities themselves. (767)

Indeed, in book II of DA, Aristotle standardly follows the procedure: identify first the object of a sense; then identify the activity which is the sensing of such objects; and finally define the sense as that faculty or capacity which is thus actualized by objects of that sort. Capacities are correlative with activities: no activity of a certain sort without a capacity, and no capacity except in relation to certain sorts of activities.

Hence, it would seem: if an 'activity' reading were correct, then we should take Aristotle as wishing to infer corresponding capacities from those activities; and if a 'capacity' reading were correct, this could only make sense as understood in relation to corresponding activities.

It seems, then, that you couldn't get a different answer, depending upon which you were focusing on, so that the language of 'activity reading'/'capacity reading' must be masking the true basis of disagreement.

Veatch's Impiety

The view that Aristotle in NE held that actions of the moral virtues are 'reasonable' and in that respect similar to philosophical contemplation is an old one, as I said the other day in a comment. For my part, I don't doubt that it's true; I merely don't find it clear.

I cited Veatch's Rational Man as a well-known text in a previous generation that puts forward that view. So I went back to Veatch, to see what exactly he said, and found this remarkable passage, in which he insists that we should take theoretical reason to be secondary to practical!

Aristotle leaves no doubt that he means to distinguish and exalt ...a life of contemplation and thought as against a life devoted merely to bringing one's thought and one's intelligence to bear on one's actions....

If this was Aristotle's position, then we have no alternative but to 'lay hands on our father' Aristotle and to come out in flat disagreement with him on this particular matter. The basis of our disagreement is simply our unshakable conviction that living is not for the sake of knowing, but rather that it is toward intelligent living that all of our powers and capacities are ultimately directed, including our powers of knowledge, and that it is the man himself who counts for more than all his knowledge, no matter how great the latter may be. In short, knowledge for its own sake can never be the be-all and end-all of human existence, nor can the chief good of man ever consist in the mere possession or even the exercise of knowledge. Not in the exercise of knowledge as such, but in its use in the practical living of our lives under the guidance of such knowledge and understanding as we possess must our characteristic perfection of human beings be thought to consist.

The lesson I draw from the passage: once one takes both sorts of reasoning, theoretical and practical, to be similar or analogous, then one needs a criterion to place one before the other. And then it seems that: for Aristotle, the eudaimonia of God, and God's being the principle of goodness for the entire universe, serves as that criterion.

Addendum to "DA 3.2 in Context"

Since writing the previous post, I found that (as I had suspected) there is indeed a passage in Caston's paper that deals with the prima facie difficulty I raised:

...it no more follows that we see by sight than it follows that we see that we see. Aristotle always asserts that we perceive that we see, never that we see that we see. In so far as this sort of awareness is common to all perception, Aristotle is right to ascribe it to the perceptual capacity as a whole in On Sleep and Waking (2, 444a15-22)--it is not something vision possesses in so far as it is specifically the activity of sight. The perceptual system sees in virtue of its visual part. But it perceives that it sees in virtue of the nature of perception more generally (cf. On Perception and Perceptibles 7, 449a10-11, a18-22). (779)

--An elegant statement of something like the harmonization that, I had suggested (following Johansen and others), was available to the capacity view.

Nonetheless the point remains:

• Consistency with De Somno 2 is a prima facie difficulty for both the activity and capacity readings.
• Both readings would be advised to handle the difficulty in roughly the same way (with the capacity reading having perhaps a slight advantage here).
• Hence considerations about the context of DA 3.2, which (it seems) favor the capacity reading, remain in place and retain their force.

De Anima 3.2 in Context

I liked it that Johansen’s paper began by trying to locate 3.2 within the program of De Anima as a whole. Usually the best way to see the significance of part of an Aristotelian treatise is to discover its role or function in the entire treatise. I've found that interpreters often go astray by looking at an Aristotelian text in isolation.

But this gave rise to Johansen’s first argument against Caston. Johansen argued that Aristotle’s general procedure in the De Anima is to explain life in terms of different sorts of faculties. This is evident throughout book II and in the rest of book III. We should therefore expect that 3.2 would similarly be an inquiry into whether a new faculty needs to be postulated in order to account for ‘perceiving that we perceive’. Thus we should expect 3.2 to be fundamentally making a point about capacities.

But Caston has a reply. He's familiar with this argument (a common view) and summarizes it nicely in his paper:

The motivation for a capacity reading appears to come directly from context. Having finished the discussion of the individual senses, Aristotle begins Book 3 of On the Soul by considering whether the five individual senses are sufficient to account for other perceptual abilities we possess, such as perceiving common perceptibles, or discriminating the perceptible qualities of one modality form another, or (on the capacity reading) perceiving that we see or here. On this reading, Aristotle would be resisting here, as elsewhere, an unnecessary multiplication of capacities, preferring instead to ground different abilities in a single capacity. (763)

Caston seems to admit that the argument has some force, but he tries to deflect its force by appeal to an even wider context:

But construing the passage in this way puts it at odds, prima facie, with other parts of his psychology. In On Sleeping and Waking [De Somno], Aristotle expressly denies that we perceive that we see by the capacity of sight:

There is a certain common capacity that supervenes on the others, by which one perceives that one is seeing and hearing. For it is surely not by sight that one sees that one sees…[455a15ff]

The difficulty is only prima facie, and Caston admits that a defender of a capacity reading could handle it in a variety of ways—with a developmental theory, for instance, or by holding that “in the end the two passages amount to much the same thing, though expressed in different ways.”

And it’s this latter approach that Johansen favors: Take De Somno (he suggested) to be saying that it’s not by the sense of sight in its standard or principal use that we perceive that we see; take De Anima to be saying that it’s sight in the respect in which it has the same power as any sense faculty (that is, as a “common sense”) by which we perceive that we see. Then there is no contradiction.

Okay, then, this disposes of the prima facie difficulty. So then, now where do we stand? It would seem that the point about the immediate context of 3.2 returns now, with something like its original force, and we should (once again) expect that the passage is making a claim about faculties or capacities. So it doesn't seem that Caston really has deflected the force of this consideration.

And then, additionally: it’s not as if the De Somno passage isn’t equally a prima facie difficulty for Caston’s interpretation. Yes, on the capacity reading, DA 3.2 ends up claiming explicitly that nothing more than sight is needed to explain perceiving that we see. But note: on Caston’s interpretation, it would seem that DA 3.2 ends up maintaining this, even if it does not say it outright. Recall, on Caston’s interpretation of DA 3.2, perceiving that one sees is built into each act of seeing. An act of seeing, and an act of perceiving that one sees, are one and the same act. But then, it would seem (at least prima facie): if sight accomplishes the first, then sight is similarly responsible for the second, and “we perceive that we see by the capacity of sight”.

Actually, it seems easier to make the capacity reading consistent with De Somno. It makes sense to say that a capacity can be used in a non-standard or incidental way, or only in a certain respect (‘in the respect in which that capacity has the same powers as other sense capacities’). But it seems less plausible to say that a feature that is inherent in the activity of a faculty—always, inevitably, inseparably—is not to be attributed to that faculty.

How Would Approximation Work Here?

I think many of us regard ourselves as floundering in trying to grasp this notion of 'approximation'. I don't take that itself to cast suspicion on the notion. Rather, I think it's extremely difficult to understand what it means to say that ethical action is reasonable (as I do believe).

Here's the sort of thing about which Aristotle says something fairly definite. Can we say with some confidence whether or not approximation works here?

I go to the store and make a purchase. Say, I buy a box of candies for $6. I give the cashier a $10 bill. The cashier mistakenly believes I've used a $20 bill and gives me $14 in change. I don't count my change until later, when I'm in another store and take out money to pay for something else. Then I discover the extra money and realize that the cashier had made a mistake.

There's no issue of getting caught or being found out. It was an 'honest mistake' and the sum is relatively small. Nonetheless I decide that I'll go back and return the extra $10. Let's suppose that I don't think that "I should" go back, or that "it would be wrong" if I didn't. Let's just say that this strikes me as a good thing to do. Maybe I remember the story of Honest Abe Lincoln from my youth, and I remember, too, that I've often thought that I'd like to do something similarly admirable.

So I return the money. Now, in doing so, I part with $10 that I didn't need to part with. But Aristotle would regard this as a quasi-exchange (see NE 9.8). I part with the $10, and in that respect lose something, but the action which I did was 'noble' (kalon), and I somehow gain this kalon aspect of the action in doing it. Since what is kalon is better than what is useful or chresimon (always or for the most part--it doesn't matter which, because it doesn't matter here) I'm actually better off (Aristotle thinks) having gone back to the store to return the money than if I had pocketed the extra money and returned home, or bought something with it.

I'm fairly confident this way of looking at this 'just' action is Aristotelian in spirit. Now the question is: Does it make sense (does it help, does it seem correct) to say that my returning the money is an 'approximation' to philosophical contemplation?

Another question (which is like one I raised in one of my first posts on the book): Is it that (i) my returning the money is similar to philosophical contemplation, or that (ii) my returning the money is similar to objects of philosophical contemplation (in being kalon)? If the latter, then perhaps we'd want to say: the object of philosophical contemplation and virtuous action is the same, the kalon, but one obtains the kalon in action by doing a kalon action, whereas one obtains the kalon in thinking by thinking about something kalon.

This would make virtuous actions similar to philosophical contemplation, yet I don't see that we should say that the former 'approximates' the latter, unless we held that the kalon of virtuous action approximated the kalon which we contemplate in philosophical contemplation. And yet it would seem bizarre to hold that the sort of kalon produced by the just action described above, which involves (as Aristotle thinks) simple equalities, such as that 6 = (10 - 14) +10 , approximate the kalon of those objects that a philosopher would want to contemplate. (It hardly seems, too, that the great worth of virtuous actions is captured in the reflection: "True enough, 5=5 is a fairly boring truth, but, given that you're in no position to contemplate now, and you need to buy food, that's the best you can achieve for now.")

Btw, Lear deals with courage, moderation, and magnanimity in Happy Lives, but not justice (for space limitations, she explains). But isn't this unfortunate?--because it would seem that justice (as Aristotle understands it, as involving equalities) would likely provide the most promising examples for a theory of 'approximation'.

Johansen v. Caston: Antecedent Arduousness

Johansen claims DA 3.2 is consistent with an inner sense theory; Caston, that it presents an account of the structure of an act of sense perception (or 'consciousness'). My plan is to state Johansen's arguments or considerations one-by-one and to place against these arguments or considerations from Caston's paper (or any additionally that I can devise), and then invite readers to contribute their own observations.

Here's a preliminary point, about which interpretation has the more difficult weight of proof.

Johansen takes DA 3.2 to be arguing a relatively weak thesis of 'nothing compels'. That is, Johansen takes the passage to be concerned with whether we need to postulate a faculty, in addition to the five senses, in order to account for our activity of perceiving that we perceive. And he takes Aristotle to conclude that, no, nothing compels us to do so (and then, given that we are not so compelled, parsimony suggests that we not do so). As Johansen stated in his BACAP lecture:

...the project of the De Anima [is] motivated in part by a concern with explanatory economy that is typical of what is commonly known as 'faculty psychology'. Aristotle wants to show how a variety of psychological phenomena can be explained by reference to a few fundamental capacities: no faculties praeter necessitatem.

Johansen, then, regards DA 3.2 as arguing for the relatively weak thesis that the phenomenon of 'perceiving that we perceive' carries with it no such necessity.

Caston, in contrast, attributes to DA a positive view that--it is recognized by those who study Caston's paper--is a rich, bold, and interesting thesis (even if Aristotle never held it). As Caston puts it:

Aristotle holds that a single token perception can be about an external object and about itself. This sort of awareness is therefore both intrinsic and relational. (799)

Because a higher-order content is involved, consciousness is still intentional and hence relational. But in so far as only one token is involved, it must be a reflexive relation: in addition to being directed upon an external object, such as an azure sky, the token activity will be directed upon itself. Such awareness is immediate. It is unmediated by any further token activity, let alone a representation of itself; nor is there any transition between the perception and the awareness of it, and hence no inference or causal relation between them. The relation is more intimate: both aspects are essential to any token perception. (778)

For Caston, that Aristotle denies that we need to postulate an 'inner sense' is a consequence of this rich view:

For these reasons, Aristotle cannot accept an 'inner sense' or internal scanner whose activities are distinct tokens from the activities they monitor. (779)

So the methodological point I wish to make is simply this: since Johansen seeks to get so much less out of the passage, antecedently one should expect that his interpretation would be easier to defend. (Yes, of course, this means nothing if the one interpretation can account for details of the text which the other cannot; but, still, the point is important in judging success and especially in evaluating 'close calls'.)

(Note: Despite the title of his BACAP lecture, it's not correct to say that Johansen regards 3.2 as putting forward an 'inner sense' theory. If I understand him, his view is that 3.2 merely denies that a special sense is required in addition to the five senses, to account for 'perceiving that we perceive'--not that it asserts that what does account for this is an 'inner sense'.)

"In Defense of Inner Sense": text and translations

"Inner sense theory", Johansen began his BACAP lecture, "holds that we are conscious of our own perceptions by virtue of further perceptions which have those first perceptions as their object." He claimed that a correct analysis of De Anima 3.2.425 b12-25 reveals that Aristotle held such a theory.

Inner sense theory stands in contrast to Victor Caston's view ("Aristotle on Consciousness"), according to which each act of sensation of each sense organ carries with it, inherently, an aspect of reflexivity, so that it is an act of perception of a proper sensible, and an act of perceiving that we perceive, at the same time. Caston claims that it's his view that is supported by a correct analysis of that De Anima passage.

I propose to test these views by placing them in opposition to each other. In this case, the exercise will not be solely my own construction, since many of Johansen's remarks in his lecture were explicitly directed against Caston's interpretation and arguments.

Here I give the necessary materials: the Greek text, and the translations of Johansen and Caston. It will be seen that (roughly) Johansen takes the passage to be principally about faculties or sense-capacities (a 'capacity reading'); Caston takes it to be principally about the structure of perceptions (an 'activity reading').

GREEK TEXT (FROM TLG)
)Epei\ d' ai0sqano&meqa o3ti o(rw~men kai\ a)kou&omen, a)na&gkh

h2 th~ o1yei ai0sqa&nesqai o3ti o(ra~, h2 e9te/ra. a)ll' h( au)th_ e1stai

th~j o1yewj kai\ tou~ u(pokeime/nou xrw&matoj, w3ste h2 du&o tou~

au)tou~ e1sontai h2 au)th_ au(th~j. e1ti d' ei0 kai\ e9te/ra ei1h h( th~j (15)

o1yewj ai1sqhsij, h2 ei0j a1peiron ei]sin h2 au)th& tij e1stai au(th~j:

w3st' e0pi\ th~j prw&thj tou~to poihte/on. e1xei d' a)pori/an: ei0 ga_r

to_ th~ o1yei ai0sqa&nesqai/ e0stin o(ra~n, o(ra~tai de\ xrw~ma h2 to_

e1xon, ei0 o1yetai/ tij to_ o(rw~n, kai\ xrw~ma e3cei to_ o(rw~n prw~-

ton. fanero_n toi/nun o3ti ou)x e4n to_ th~ o1yei ai0sqa&nesqai: kai\ (20)

ga_r o3tan mh_ o(rw~men, th~ o1yei kri/nomen kai\ to_ sko&toj kai\

to_ fw~j, a)ll' ou)x w(sau&twj. e1ti de\ kai\ to_ o(rw~n e1stin w(j

kexrwma&tistai: to_ ga_r ai0sqhth&rion dektiko_n tou~ ai0sqhtou~ a1neu

th~j u3lhj e3kaston: dio_ kai\ a)pelqo&ntwn tw~n ai0sqhtw~n e1neisin

ai0sqh&seij kai\ fantasi/ai e0n toi=j ai0sqhthri/oij.

JOHANSEN
Since we perceive that we see and hear, it is necessary [b12] that one perceives that one sees either by sight (opsis) or by some other [sense]. But the same [sense] will be [b13] of sight and the underlying colour, so that either there will be two [senses] [b14] of the same thing or it [the sense] will be of itself. And furthermore, if indeed the sense of sight were different [b15], then either it will go on to infinity or some sense will be of itself, [b16] so that we should do this in the case of the first [sense]. But there is a puzzle (aporia): for if [b17] perceiving by sight is seeing, and colour or what [b18] has colour is seen, [then] something is going to see what sees (to horôn), then what first sees [or the first thing that sees] [b19] will also have colour. However, it is clear that perceiving by sight is not one thing; for even [b20] when we are not seeing, we discriminate both darkness and [b21] light by sight, but not in the same way. Moreover, what sees is actually (kai) coloured in a way [b22]: for the sense-organ is in each case receptive of the sense-object without [b23] the matter. That is why perceptions (aisthêseis) and appearances (phantasiai) are present in the sense-organs [b24] even when the sense-objects have departed.’

CASTON (b12-16 only)
Since we perceive that we see and hear, it is necessary either by means of the seeing that one perceives that one sees or by another [perception]. But the same [perception] will be both of the seeing and of the colour that underlies it, with the result that either two [perceptions] will be of the same thing, or it [sc. the perception] will be of itself. Further, if the perception of seeing is a different [perception], either this will proceed to infinity or some [perception] will be of itself; so that we ought to posit this in the first instance.

(I was not able to find in Caston's paper a translation of the remainder of the passage in accordance with the 'activity reading' .)

The Spiritual Advice of Hard-Living Philosophers

Life among hard-living philosophers makes it difficult for me to post . The seminar at Brown yesterday afternoon; then a coffee and quick snack before the lecture, which ended at 9:30; then a dinner party lasting to midnight. It wasn't until 2 am that I got home. Then teaching all day today, but, because it's the last day of classes, a colleague has just come around with wine and cigars...and that's before a promised dinner out with my wife....

Yet there's much to post. Johansen's seminar and lecture were superb; Kosman's commentary was fascinating. In developing his own view, Johansen raised what seemed to me serious objections to Victor Caston's paper, "Aristotle on Consciousness", which I want to think carefully about, returning to Caston's paper. Then too I want to reply to Sean Kelsey's interesting thoughts on 'approximation'.

But that will have to wait until tomorrow. For now, I should follow, rather, some 'spiritual advice' given to me yesterday.

When I was leaving the dinner party last night with a colleague, I joked with Aryeh Kosman about wanting to pick up some cigars for the ride home. Aryeh grabbed my arm and said, smiling, "Oh no, save the cigars for tomorrow. Get some good cheese, some wine, and--I'm telling this to you as spiritual advice--then smoke those cigars."

I couldn't of course ignore spiritual advice like that, offered in true wisdom and with genuine goodwill!

Johansen and Kosman at Brown, today

I'll be attending Thomas Johansen's BACAP seminar this afternoon at Brown, and then his 7pm lecture, with Aryeh Kosman commenting, on 'common sense' and perceiving that we perceive in Aristotle's psychology. (See the notice, here.) I haven't read the paper yet, but I gather Victor Caston's paper is one of Johansen's targets. Should be interesting.

With luck, I'll post something later about it, and more on Happy Lives, when I return.

For the Sake Of, For Its Own Sake

As regards actions of the various virtues of character (courage, moderation, justice, etc.), there are three questions:

1. Why do we do them at all?
2. Why do we do them, rather than the contrary?
3. Why do we do them, when doing the contrary would enable us to spend more time in contemplation?

For instance: a philosopher looks forward to his sabbatical year; but just that year an enemy attacks his country: (a) he joins in the defense of his country; (b) in battles he acts courageously rather than as a coward; and (c) when doing something particularly courageous, he is killed, when, he if he had acted then as a coward, he would have lived (affording him the chance to return to philosophy later).

(a) raises question 1.
(b) raises question 2.
(c) raises question 3.

It’s easy to devise similar examples for the other virtues. For instance, as regards justice: a philosopher looks forward to his sabbatical year; but just that year his father falls seriously ill: (a) he spends the year caring for him; (b) he does so with devotion and refinement, rather than badly and with coarseness; and (c) if he had provided care in a perfunctory way, or in some respects had neglected this care, he would have had more time for philosophical thought. (Note: this is a case of justice for Aristotle.)

Now here’s a puzzle: one might wish to answer 1. and 2. in a way that suggests a ‘for the sake of happiness, for its own sake’ structure to our actions, but in that case it becomes difficult to answer 3.

We answer 1. and 2. in this way. Actions of the various virtues of character are actions that we do on the supposition, or condition, that we already need to do something other than contemplate. We need to eat, to engage in business to procure clothing and shelter, to defend against an attacker. We are going to do these things anyway, so we might as well do them appropriately and well. Thus: in doing them at all, we are doing something (‘instrumentally’) for the sake of leisure and contemplation; in doing them well, we are doing something for its own sake. So the answer to 1. is that we do these actions of the various virtues of character because they are ways of doing things that we would have been doing anyway, and the answer to 2. is that these actions are worth choosing (they are ‘appropriate’, ‘due’, ‘fitting’, prepon) whereas actions of the contrary vices are not.

But if this is so, then it is difficult to see why we choose [taking care of necessities well + not contemplating] over [taking care of necessities poorly + contemplating] (question 3). It looks as though this is a mistake: it’s as if we forget that the morally virtuous actions were done in the first place only on the supposition that actions necessary for leisure had to be done.

If we granted that the notion of ‘approximation’ was in play in Aristotle’s Ethics, what help could it give in these matters? It’s of no use in answering 1. (that’s answered by an appeal to necessity). It’s also clearly of no use in answering 3. (because there is no reason why we’d accept an approximation if the real thing were available). The only help it can give is in 2. And yet there an appeal to approximation seems either unnecessary or inapt. For instance: justice is frequently backward-looking, not forward-looking. The reason (Aristotle thinks) a grown child should, in justice, care for his infirm parent, is that in the past the parent conferred goods upon the child that the child can never fully repay. The child’s care of his parent is in response to that, not apparently with a view to any contemplation to which the action tends or contributes.