tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11017234.post111534079819302752..comments2023-11-16T07:12:40.867-05:00Comments on Dissoi Blogoi: Does Justice Exist?Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11017234.post-1115412197026452672005-05-06T16:43:00.000-04:002005-05-06T16:43:00.000-04:00There are two indispensible features of Glaucon's ...There are two indispensible features of Glaucon's Gyges story: (1) all of the penalties of acting unjustly are completely & certainly removed, and (2) the rewards for acting unjustly are significant & attractive. <BR/>"No man," says Glaucon, "can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in justice" when he has the opportunity of getting what Gyges got without fear of retribution.<BR/>By contrast, what does it show if men aren't generally attracted to minor acts of undetectable dishonesty? It shows no more than that we distain such behaviour & just aren't tempted by it. Glaucon's point is that if you offer men the oppportunity to claim significant rewards by undetectable injustice, you will see how readily they all desert their enforced professions & pretence of justice.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11017234.post-1115407014450498192005-05-06T15:16:00.000-04:002005-05-06T15:16:00.000-04:00Well, I wonder if other blog readers would want to...Well, I wonder if other blog readers would want to chime in on this one--what exactly is the force of the tale about the ring, and whether more common, or smaller, temptations to act unjustly can be analogous?<BR/><BR/>In my view, at the beginning of Rep 2, it's agreed that justice is advantageous, that is, that justice is the sort of thing that generally brings good along with it, and that injustice is disadvantageous. What is at issue is then: Once the advantageousness of acting justly is removed, is there any further reason to be just? (Similarly: Once the disadvantageousness of acting unjustly is removed, is there any further reason not to be unjust?)<BR/><BR/>The Ring story raises these questions in a particularly effective way, because it removes the typical consequences of action 'globally'. In my example of the Fortune 500 executive, one might say that he can never be <I>entirely</I> confident that he'll escape the typical consequences of his action. But someone with the ring is completely immune from the usual consequences of his actions (or, at least, that's the conceit of the story). <BR/><BR/>Anonymous' dismissing the taking of $8 as 'paltry' to my mind begs the question. Why is it 'paltry' rather than sensible, or efficient, obviously preferable?Michael Pakalukhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00233648836210188722noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11017234.post-1115400066985133552005-05-06T13:21:00.000-04:002005-05-06T13:21:00.000-04:00The story of Gyges (at Rep.II. 359d seq) is meant ...The story of Gyges (at Rep.II. 359d seq) is meant to show that a just man, if given the means to safely pursue injustice in a ways he believes will significantly benefit him, will abandon justice and revert to a life of injustice. The invisible Gyges usurps the kingdom, takes the queen, loots & pillages as he wishes. <BR/>The story of Gyges is not the story of a man who can steal $8 from one of his fellow shepherds without being caught. We can imagine Gyges declining such a paltry act of dishonesty merely as “infra dig”. The trivial sum simply would not tempt him. <BR/>And neither would it constitute a test of his or anyone else’s professions to remain just or honest in circumstances where there are significant safe “rewards” for injustice. That is Glaucon’s point, I take it. Our professions of virtue will fail if we are offered the safe ways to indulge in vices that really are attractive to us.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com